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Analog Amnesia in the Digital Age 
Julia Huggins 
 A culturally and historically particular understanding of modern memory underscores 
ongoing popular debates concerning the status of human memory in the digital age. In an era 
circumscribed by anxiety around the extent to which digital technologies are eroding the 
boundaries of the human, this thesis argues that a bifurcated model of memory has emerged. This 
is to say that our understanding of human memory in the digital age has splintered along 
technological lines; on one hand, a model of technologically mediated memory associated with 
digital technologies and, on the other, a kind of subconscious embodied memory aligned with the 
human in its ‘natural’ state. Such a scenario insists on the distinction between the conscious 
memories we preserve through external technologies and the dormant memories housed in the 
depths of our psyches, which are imagined to be less amenable to technological intervention. We 
can observe this bifurcated model of memory at work in cinematic representations of amnesia in 
many recent Hollywood films, though this thesis will focus on Peter Segal’s 50 First Dates 
(2004) as a case study. Firstly, I examine how this dyadic model of memory emerges from the 
film’s nostalgic privileging of analog technologies, by virtue of their connection to the human 
body, as opposed to digital technologies, which are regarded more apprehensively due to their 
alienation from the body. Secondly, I work through the broader significance of this twofold 
model of memory for contemporary debates around authorship and the domains of private and 
public (virtual) space. Ultimately, through a symptomatic analysis of the intersecting functions of 
memory, technology, and intimacy in 50 First Dates, this project endeavours to demonstrate how 
this dyadic model of memory informs and is informed by discourses around what it means to be 
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50 First Dates, Peter Segal’s broad romantic comedy, deals with memory loss as a 
disruptive force in a romantic relationship. Complicating this disruption further is the complex 
role technology and material culture play in memory processes throughout the film. As such, the 
film stages a convergence of the central intersecting issues of this project: memory, technology, 
and intimacy. By conducting a symptomatic reading of 50 First Dates, I aim to take seriously the 
film’s hierarchical taxonomy of memory technologies along the analog/digital spectrum and 
explore its engagement with the status of memory in the age of technology. This thesis works 
through a case study analysis of 50 First Dates in two key stages. The first chapter, “The Eternal 
Sunshine of Lucy’s Mind: A Bifurcated Model of Modern Memory,” constituting the bulk of my 
textual analysis, works through the film’s understanding of the relationship between memory and 
material culture – the objects along the analog/digital spectrum that we use to mediate, preserve, 
and even supplant our memories. What emerges from this relationship is a model of a 
technologically mediated memory that reflects particular cultural concerns of the early Twenty-
First Century, specifically regarding the extent to which technology is eroding our memory and 
our ability to form intimate relationships with others. Similar to other contemporary amnesia 
films, 50 First Dates contrasts this technologically mediated memory with a kind of 
subconscious embodied memory, aligned with analog technologies imagined to bear a close 
indexical relationship to the body. The second chapter, “My Private Alaska: Memory, 
Technology, and (Co)Authorship,” investigates the extent to which this technologically mediated 
memory renders itself vulnerable to the claims of multiple authors, and works through the power 
dynamics that emerge in such a situation. Specifically, I aim to elucidate how a model of 
technologically mediated memory punctuates what has been called a “participatory turn”1 in 
                                                
1 Burgess, 13. 
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contemporary memory processes (largely through the use of personal computers) in which we 
struggle to act as effective gatekeepers to our personal memory ‘archives’ in the face of 
corporate ownership (and algorithmic organization) of our most intimate ‘data.’ More broadly, I 
seek to examine how the film positions love as a kind of panacea to the failings of human 
memory and the encroaching threat of technology. By focusing on the phenomenon of amnesia, 
both chapters emphasize how this dyadic model of modern memory (or memory loss) may 
disrupt and (re)structure intimacy in a romantic coupling. For 50 First Dates, while 
technologically mediated memory may facilitate courtship, it is subconscious embodied memory 
that houses ‘true love.’ This thesis argues that we may productively read the central project of 
the film to be the conceptual prying apart of love and memory. If new technologies (and perhaps 
particularly the internet) are perceived to threaten the territory of human memory, which 
anxieties are assuaged by dislocating love from the space of memory? Or, more precisely, what 
are the implications of the film’s effort to divorce love from technologically mediated memory, 
but not from the alternative model of subconscious embodied memory? Ultimately, by analyzing 
the assumptions and imperatives informing the representation of technologically mediated 
memory in 50 First Dates, I endeavour to place the film in dialogue with broader sociocultural 
anxieties and popular understandings of the function and worth of human memory in the digital 
age.  
Before examining how 50 First Dates approaches these questions, it is necessary to 
articulate more precisely the film’s sociohistorical position in relation to discourses around life in 
the age of the Internet. Sociologist Saskia Sassen, whose work has been foundational in the study 
of globalization in the digital age, outlines a concise description of the evolution of this situation 
as follows: 
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“We have three phases of the Internet. The first phase is that of the hackers, where access 
was the issue, making the software available. The second one, when you begin to have 
the interest by private actors that did not quite know how to use it. It still was mostly a 
public space, in some ways protected. And now a third stage, the invasion of cyberspace 
by corporate actors: It’s really combat out there.”2 
In addition to providing a rough sketch of a general and gradual slippage from libertarian 
optimism about the radical potentialities of the web into disillusionment at the corporate co-
opting of online community, Sassen makes a useful distinction between different “phases” of the 
Internet. In 2004, we can understand 50 First Dates to be hovering at the precipice between the 
second and third phase; online communities, chat rooms, and virtual worlds like Second Life 
proliferate, but the perhaps more organized corporate social media platforms like Facebook, 
Twitter, and YouTube have yet to emerge, at least as we know them today. Perhaps because of 
this precarious position and the uncertainty surrounding the future of life with and through the 
Internet, an air of concern, if not paranoia, tends to infuse assumptions about the status of human 
memory in the digital age. Psychologist Sherry Turkle is perhaps one of the higher profile 
examples of such an attitude. As recently as 2015, Turkle wrote a book entitled Reclaiming 
Conversation: The Power of Talk in a Digital Age. In Turkle’s earlier book, Alone Together: 
Why We Expect More from Technology and Less from Each Other, published in 2011, the 
introduction begins as follows: “Technology proposes itself as the architect of our intimacies. 
These days, it suggests substitutions that put the real on the run.”3 This brief yet important 
passage reveals two key perceptions that circumscribe discourse around the status of human 
                                                
2 Sassen, 105.  
3 Turkle, Alone Together, 1. 
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memory, or perhaps simply the human in general, in the digital age. Turkle’s first claim casts 
technology as an agent that structures intimate relationships, which, reading between the lines, 
ostensibly ought to be negotiated ‘directly’ between human beings. Secondly, Turkle contends 
that technology ‘suggests substitutions’ to what would otherwise be ‘natural’ mechanisms of 
intimacy that actively threaten ‘the real.’ In Turkle’s model, ‘technology’ writ large emerges not 
only as an unworthy substitute, but also an antagonist force hacking at the human faculties it 
endeavours to replace, the logical response then becomes to defend the human from the digital. 
Turkle’s books are typically best-sellers, as are publications with similar investigative concerns 
such as Nicholas Carr’s, The Shallows: What the Internet Is Doing to Our Brains, a finalist for 
the Pulitzer Prize in 2011. The remarkable popularity of these and countless other accounts from 
the digital doldrums – of how digital technologies, particularly the Internet and ‘smart’ devices, 
are affecting how we interact (or not) with each other and even the chemistry of our brains – 
speaks to both the ubiquity and the lasting power of technophobic impulses in our time. 
Moreover, it appears that the common ‘solution’ to the perils of the digital age is articulated 
through a re-commitment to the human, and perhaps especially the human body, in its ‘natural’ 
(i.e., pre-digital) state. It is this techno-phobic and -philic ‘combat,’ to borrow from Sassen, that 
constitutes the contextual background of both the production of 50 First Dates and my 
subsequent analysis. 
 
TERMS OF USE 
Given the triangular conceptual framework of this thesis, it is necessary here to pause and 
clarify my use of the key terms ‘memory,’ ‘technology,’ and ‘intimacy.’ To begin, although my 
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own conception of memory is certainly informed by philosophical theorizations4 and scientific 
accounts5 – indeed, this thesis does not avoid reference to the field of neuropsychology – my 
intention is not to propose a model of memory that is strictly ‘correct’ in terms of what we know 
of the workings of the human brain. Rather, my interest in memory for the purposes of this 
project begins and ends with the bifurcated model of memory that emerges from cinematic 
representations of amnesia and what this model may reveal about how we understand the status 
of memory in the digital age, whatever the case may actually be. After all, as Kilbourn reminds 
us apropos of The Bourne Ultimatum and its tacit agreement with Sigmund Freud’s assertion that 
that which is repressed endures the passage of time, “such thoroughly ‘unscientific’ notions 
remain fixtures in popular cinema’s representation of memory.”6 Thus it becomes important not 
to offer a corrective to chronic misrepresentation, but rather to investigate the particularities of 
popular representations of memory in the digital age. It follows that in my construction and 
differentiation of subconscious embodied memory on the one hand and technologically mediated 
memory on the other, I do not purport to have ‘discovered’ a theory of modern memory. Instead, 
the task of this thesis is to investigate the underlying ideological frameworks that contribute to 
the popular understanding of human memory in the digital age reflected in the film. Furthermore, 
due in part because 50 First Dates depicts an amnesiac subject, my focus on memory attends less 
to memory as a process of inscribing new memories or even as an act of recollection and more to 
a model of memory as storage. As suggested by the aforementioned dyadic model of memory, 
                                                
4 Works consulted include Henri Bergson’s Matter and Memory, Gilles Deleuze’s Bergsonism, 
and Bliss Cua Lim’s Translating Time, which stages a thorough investigation of Bergson’s 
theories of memory. 
5 Works consulted and/or cited include neuropsychologist Sallie Baxendale’s “Memories Aren’t 
Made of This: Amnesia at the Movies,” Christine N. Smith et al’s “Losing Memories Overnight: 
A Unique Form of Human Amnesia,” and multiple works by psychologist Sherry Turkle. 
6 Kilbourn, 139. 
 7 
the stakes of this thesis are served best by a focus on how the film regards differently memories 
stored in either subconscious embodied memory or technologically mediated memory. 
Furthermore, since many of the key characteristics associated with the digital address the 
seemingly infinite storage abilities and documentary recording capacities facilitated by 
ubiquitous networked computing, narrowing our attention to the storage function of memory in 
50 First Dates is especially relevant to the dialogue I construct between the film’s bifurcated 
model of memory and contemporary cultural concerns around the perils of life in the digital age. 
From a certain perspective, the term ‘technology’ has somewhat lost its power as a 
meaningful categorization. Writing in 1997, historian David Rooney asserts that scholarly 
lamentation over the term’s lack of precision “elicits no useful insights for those in pursuit of an 
understanding of the role of technology in society.”7 Instead, Rooney views the “necessary 
complexity”8 of any effort to carve out a definition of technology as a marker of the term’s 
strength and potential. He explains that the Greek root of technology, techné, as well as Max 
Weber’s use of the German technik, stretch to encompass both material devices and practical 
knowledge or techniques.9 By rehearsing the long etymological history of technology, Rooney 
demonstrates the extent to which the term has perhaps always accommodated a cluster of 
diverging and overlapping functions. Following from Rooney, while when I discuss 
‘technologically mediated memory’ I am referring principally to higher-tech devices such as 
video cameras and laptop computers, it is important for me to maintain a certain degree of 
categorical flexibility. Thus within ‘technologically mediated memory’ I also include ‘gadgets’ 
along the analog/digital spectrum so long as they facilitate the externalization or mediatization of 
                                                
7 Rooney, 399. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Rooney, 400. 
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what is otherwise understood to be ‘natural’ human memory. This is to say that I understand the 
‘technologicality’ of these mediating gadgets to be a difference of degree, not necessarily of 
kind. For the sake of clarity, when I make reference to more stubbornly analog objects, I favour 
the perhaps even broader descriptor, ‘material culture.’ Such an approach takes its cue from 
Daniel Miller’s 2010 book Stuff in which the cultural anthropologist conducts a symptomatic 
reading of our ‘stuff’ – that is, the world of objects created by humanity that includes anything 
from clothing to coffins and fizzy drinks. Challenging what he views to be a lack of critical 
scholarly attention to material culture, Miller extrapolates from our relationships with stuff in 
order to reach insights about how these relationships structure our social worlds. In a similar 
vein, my analysis of analog/digital technologies and material culture more broadly aims to take 
seriously our quotidian relationships with the stuff of memory mediation. 
In addition to Miller’s anthropological approach, my understanding and analysis of the 
stuff of technologically mediated memory is shaped by Bill Brown’s seminal work on “Thing 
Theory,” in which he argues: 
“We begin to confront the thingness of objects when they stop working for us: […] when 
their flow within the circuits of production and distribution, consumption and exhibition, 
has been arrested, however momentarily. The story of objects asserting themselves as 
things then, is the story of a changed relation to the human subject and thus the story of 
how the thing really names less an object than a particular subject-object relation.”10 
Following from Brown, I take the opportunity provided by 50 First Dates to confront memory at 
the point of breakdown – it is in this sense that amnesia accommodates an investigation of 
memory’s complex working relationship with technology. In other words, when in the film 
                                                
10 Brown, 4. 
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memory ceases to function as it should, it reveals perhaps more readily its assumed underlying 
structure, which I will argue is constituted by the dyadic model of memory outlined above.  
Finally, it is necessary to outline briefly how I will proceed to discuss the ways in which 
a model of subconscious embodied memory and/or technologically mediated memory 
(re)structures understandings of ‘intimacy.’ The notion of intimacy is important to this project 
because, after all, 50 First Dates – not to mention several other amnesia films cited throughout – 
deals with amnesia within the context of an intimate romantic relationship. In actuality, the film 
is concerned with the technological substitution of Lucy’s memory only insofar as it facilitates 
her loving relationship with Henry. Beyond narrative content, intimacy is also the dimension of 
interpersonal human relationships that is commonly understood to be most vulnerable to the 
antagonistic thrusts of the digital age. Indeed, when Turkle claims that we expect more from 
technology and less from each other, the traumatic ceding of ‘human’ territory to the digital is 
measured in terms of intimacy. To be human in such conversations appears to mean being a 
subject who can and does form intimate relationships with others. This is to say that when we 
talk about the human in the digital age, it is important to remember that we are always already 
talking about intimacy. Dominic Pettman’s Love and Other Technologies: Refitting Eros for the 
Information Age provides a useful model here. Through his focus on the triangulation of love, 
technology, and community, Pettman works to reveal and contribute to some of the 
underdeveloped areas of discourses around the profound role of technology in contemporary life. 
He contends, “current conceptions of love and community are hampered by our neglect of a third 
term, namely, technology.”11 Pettman draws attention to the perhaps underexplored ways in 
which contemporary understandings of human community shift beneath the lens of modern 
                                                
11 Pettman, 15. 
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technological life. Informed by Jean-Luc Nancy’s concept of “being singular plural”12 in which 
we emerge as subjects not before but through the encounter with the other, Pettman makes a case 
for love as a technology of belonging. Though Pettman’s conception of ‘technology’ is obviously 
more philosophical than my operationalization of the term, he enriches this assumption of a kind 
of basic plurality by considering how digital technologies and popular media complicate such 
understandings. In other words, Pettman historicizes what can tend to be ahistorical and acultural 
models of community, or ‘intimacy’ for my purposes. My efforts to account for the cultural and 
technological specificities of the representation of amnesia in 50 First Dates similarly insists on 
the profound role technology plays in shaping understandings of what it means to be human in 
the digital age. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
In order to pull together discourses around memory, technology, and intimacy in the 
digital age, it is necessary to call upon work from a diverse set of scholarly communities. 
Consequently, this thesis draws from the fields of film and cultural studies, philosophy, video 
game studies, cybernetics, psychoanalytic theory, neuropsychology, sociology, cultural 
anthropology, and even paleoanthropology. Additionally, I seek to provide an enriched 
contextual background beyond academe by including popular news articles and situating my case 
study within a broader history of popular Hollywood amnesia films. Since my object of analysis 
is a Hollywood rom-com and I am conducting a culturally symptomatic reading of the film, it 
follows that my claims and their supporting scholarship are from and limited to a particular 
                                                
12 See Jean-Luc Nancy, Being Singular Plural, Trans. Robert D Richardson and Anne E. 
O’Byrne, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000.  
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Western perspective. In other words, I do not suggest that the conclusions I draw from the 
following analysis are generalizable to a kind of global experience of digital modernity; while 
transcultural interventions into the bifurcated model of memory outlined in this thesis merit 
attention, they are beyond the scope of this project. That being said, by placing a body of diverse 
scholarly and popular perspectives in dialogue, I endeavour to cultivate a necessarily complex 
discursive context in which to stage my analysis. 
In addition to the scholars mentioned in the ‘Terms of Use’ section, it is important to note 
the array of interdisciplinary scholarship from which this thesis takes its cue. Beyond more 
contemporary resources, my research is shaped by Frances Yates’ thorough investigation of 
memory before the advent of the printing press that connects the ‘art of memory’ to the history 
of Western culture writ large – from ancient Greek rhetoricians, to the Middle Ages, the 
Renaissance, and into the seventeenth century. Yates’ work on how the art of memory came to 
be connected to certain conceptions of the soul in the Middle Ages is particularly relevant to my 
theorization of subconscious embodied memory and its connection to a kind of essential truth of 
one’s identity, which we may read as an implicit analog to the soul. By emphasizing how the art 
of memory has been called upon to perform different cultural work Yates provides valuable 
background for my thinking on the nexus of memory and technology in a more contemporary 
context. 
More recently, scholars such as Russell J.A. Kilbourn and José van Dijck have conducted 
essential and historically specific work on the critical interstices of memory and technology. 
Kilbourn’s book on the intersections of cinema, memory, and modernity has been a valuable 
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resource throughout the foundational and final stages of this thesis.13 In an expansive 
transnational study of mainstream Hollywood films and art cinema, he both analyses the content 
of cinematic representations of memory and theorizes cinema itself as a formal reflection on the 
human experience of the passage of time. Kilbourn proceeds from the well-studied 
understanding that: 
“memory today derives its primary meaning, its existence as such, from visually based 
technologies like cinema; that cinema is not merely one of the most effective metaphors 
for memory but that cinema – alongside photography – is constitutive of memory in its 
deepest and most meaningful sense.”14  
Insofar as Kilbourn’s focus is more specifically on the transitional period of late modernity that 
precedes the explosion of digital and ‘new media’ studies, his work provides a useful model and 
informs significantly the analysis undertaken in this thesis. Indeed, through his symptomatic 
reading of the vicissitudes of memory in modern cinema, Kilbourn offers a rigorous and 
comprehensive update to Yates’ ‘art of memory’ for the age of technology. Elsewhere, Van 
Dijck ascribes to a “reconsolidation” theory of memory that rejects the possibility of completely 
separating memory from the technologies used to mediate it, thereby understanding memories as 
“manifestations of a complex interaction between brain, material objects, and the cultural matrix 
from which they arise.”15 Van Dijck’s book on the issue of mediated memory works through 
both analog and digital memory objects in spheres of personal intimacy, linking these emergent 
memory processes to the broader slippages of private and public in the digital age. Since this 
                                                
13 See Kilbourn, Cinema, Memory, Modernity: The Representation of Memory from the Art Film 
to Transnational Cinema. 
14 Kilbourn, 1. 
15 Van Dijck, Mediated Memories, 28. 
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thesis investigates the gesture towards an other that is always already embedded in the 
technological mediation of memory, it is necessary to consider the work of scholars who query 
the extent to which digital technologies have redrawn the boundaries between the intimate spaces 
of memory and the public sphere.  
In line with van Dijck, Andrew Hoskins also insists on the transformative power of 
technology in memory processes, his concept of “digital network memory”16 has helped to 
inform my work on the particularities of a kind of cyborgian model of memory in the digital age. 
Hoskins asserts that digital network memory, which aligns somewhat with the logical extreme of 
my conception of technologically mediated memory, describes a scenario in which 
“communications in themselves dynamically add to, alter, and erase, a kind of living archival 
memory.”17 It follows that Hoskins’ emphasis on a moment of significant cultural shift in terms 
of how we understand and in engage in memory processes reverberates in my study of the 
implications of the participatory turn in memory processes in the age of the Internet. 
In 2004, the proliferation of amnesia films such as 50 First Dates and Eternal Sunshine of 
the Spotless Mind prompted clinical neuropsychologist Sallie Baxendale to write about the 
representation of amnesia in popular cinema. Baxendale explains: 
“The most commonly agreed features of organic amnesic syndromes include normal 
intelligence and attention span, with severe and permanent difficulties in taking in new 
information. Personality and identity are unaffected. These distinctions, which in a 
medical setting are critical […], are often blurred at the movies.”18 
                                                
16 Hoskins, “Digital Network Memory,” 92. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Baxendale, 1480. 
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Baxendale is principally concerned with what, in her professional opinion, is a chronic trend of 
misinformation about amnesia in popular films, which is an issue that lies beyond the scope of 
this thesis. Baxendale is useful, however, insofar as she emphasizes that amnesia has been used 
as a sensational plot device since around 1915 with Jack Pratt’s Garden of Lies.19 This is not to 
say that amnesia films have remained relatively static over time. Indeed, I argue that this is 
categorically not the case; the particular cultural concerns around the status of human memory in 
the digital age inflect the representation of memory in contemporary cinema. These cultural 
concerns tend to orbit around a certain uneasiness with the extent to which we have come to rely 
on technological devices in our quotidian lives. Jonathan Crary’s work on the status of sleep in a 
lifeworld circumscribed by virtually ceaseless capitalist labour and consumption speaks rather 
directly to this uneasiness. Crary’s phrasing on the current state of affairs is worth recalling at 
length: 
“Now the brevity of the interlude before a high-tech product literally becomes garbage 
requires two contradictory attitudes to coexist: on one hand, the initial need and/or desire 
for the product, but, on the other, an affirmative identification with the process of 
inexorable cancellation and replacement. The acceleration of novelty production is a 
disabling of collective memory, and it means that the evaporation of historical knowledge 
no longer has to be implemented from the top down. The conditions of communication 
and information access on an everyday level ensure the systematic erasure of the past as 
part of the fantasmatic construction of the present.”20 
                                                
19 Ibid. 
20 Crary, 45. 
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It is important to note here that Crary’s lament essentially describes a condition of mass cultural 
amnesia as a result of the imperative of obsolescence in the digital age. The technological dark 
ages are thus figured in amnesiac terms and our ability to remember becomes tantamount to our 
ability to resist the ideological forces that govern our lives. To narrow Crary’s broader and 
overtly political critique, the pervasiveness of filmic representations of amnesia within romantic 
relationships that Baxendale identifies – particularly seeing as such representations are often 
misrepresentations – leads us to ask certain questions around the ubiquitous comingling of 
memory and intimacy. Why is amnesia so often lodged between a romantic couple as an obstacle 
that must be overcome if love is to be achieved? What might this popular scenario suggest about 
the significance of memory in our responses to the various threats of the digital age? 
 
METHODOLOGY 
As indicated in the literature review above, this project necessarily draws from many 
different scholarly fields. It is worthwhile here to recognize a selection of resources that are 
especially foundational to my argument. In Chapter I, Jack Halberstam’s analysis of the gender 
dynamics and colonial impulses behind 50 First Dates’ representation of amnesia informs my 
own analysis of how the film similarly literalizes the analog through its representation of Hawaii 
and Alaska as post- and pre-colonial spaces, respectively. Elsewhere, Mary Anne Doane’s work 
on indexicality provides much of the theoretical scaffolding for my textual analysis, though her 
work appears in important moments in Chapter II as well. In particular, Doane’s link between 
two definitions of the index – that is, as trace versus deixis – and medium specificity is critical to 
my analysis of 50 First Dates’ nostalgic privileging of analog technologies versus higher tech 
digital technologies to do the work of memory itself. Since Doane stages her argumentation 
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within cinema studies, her work is especially well suited to my study of the articulation of these 
issues in both 50 First Dates as well as the video-within-the-film. Additionally, Thomas 
Elsaesser’s explanation of a pervasive popular belief in the powerful role cinema plays in 
modern subject formation – specifically how films may continue to ‘haunt’ us long after viewing 
– informs my analysis of how media is used, with varying degrees of success, to substitute 
Lucy’s lost memory.  
Chapter II relies principally on Kaja Silverman’s work, apropos of Roland Barthes, on 
the female voice and authorial subjectivity. Taking her cue from Barthes’ proclamation of the 
death of the author in modernity and the subsequent emergence of a certain authorial ‘figure’ in 
the body of the text, Silverman theorizes an authorial subject position that is also indelibly 
female. Since a key focus of this second chapter is the extent to which the technological 
mediation of Lucy’s memory opens it up to the motivations of other ‘authors,’ Silverman’s 
emphasis on a model of specifically female authorship is placed productively in dialogue with 
my investigation of how the film variably allows or refuses Lucy’s ‘authorial authority’ via 
analog and digital technologies. Also central to the project of Chapter II is Elsaesser’s work on 
both the powerful role of cinema in understandings of mind and body in “Cinema as Brain – 
Mind and Body,” co-authored by Malte Hagener, and the status of new media technologies in 
psychoanalytic understandings of ‘writing’ and memory in “Freud as Media Theorist: Mystic 
Writing-Pads and the Matter of Memory.” Elsaesser and Hagener are especially helpful insofar 
as they yoke together a pervasive belief in cinema’s role in modern subject formation and the 
realm of film censorship with its corresponding relationship to a moralizing economy of taste. I 
mobilize Elsaesser and Hagener’s characterization of the exploitable potential for control 
embedded in this supposedly formative power of cinema in order to corroborate my assertion 
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that memory plays an important role in the constitution of authorial subjectivity. In the second 
case, Elsaesser argues that Freud’s focus on the human body/psyche as a technical medium is 
indicative of a broader, and culturally conservative, push to protect an embodied and gendered 
imagination of the human in an increasingly technological age. Since subconscious embodied 
memory constitutes one half of my dyadic model of memory, the link Elsaesser draws between 
conceptions of the human subconscious and a certain anxiety around “disembodiment, 
mechanization, […] and automation”21 helps to shape my analysis of a similar protective impulse 
that persists in the digital age.  
Ultimately, if a key concern of the digital age is the deterioration of our memory – as I 
contend it is – it follows that representations of amnesia offer the potential for insight into our 
understanding of the status of human memory in a technological era. Indeed, amnesia as the 
result of head constitutes a perhaps more seemingly manageable literalization of a much broader 
cultural anxiety around the ground human memory stands to lose with the ascension of 
technology in the digital age. Moreover, since intimacy seems to be somehow uniquely 
threatened by the decline of human memory in a technological age, representations of the 
phenomenon of amnesia within romantic relationships also lends itself to my analysis of our 
assumptions about the both collaborative and potentially antagonistic functions of memory and 
love. Thus 50 First Dates, insofar as it stages the convergence of the three key dimensions of this 
thesis – that is, memory, technology, and intimacy – functions as a valuable case study with 
which to work through a historically and technologically contingent model of modern memory. 
  
                                                
21 Elsaesser, “Freud,” 105. 
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Chapter I 
The Eternal Sunshine of Lucy’s Mind: 











50 First Dates complicates an otherwise conventional romantic comedy narrative with a 
novel (and medically impossible)22 case of amnesia. Henry (Adam Sandler) is the roguish 
veterinarian at a Hawaiian marine wildlife park who hopes to sail his ramshackle boat solo to 
Alaska one day to study the relatively understudied underwater life of walruses. As a rule, Henry 
limits himself to casual flings with tourists in order to avoid any commitments that could 
interfere with his future travels. However, Henry’s plans are interrupted when a broken sail leads 
him to the Huki Lau Café where he encounters Lucy (Drew Barrymore) who, as an island local, 
would be typically off-limits. What would have been a standard meet-cute in industry parlance is 
unsettled by Lucy’s short-term memory condition resulting from a brain injury she sustained in a 
car crash one year earlier. Lucy is unable to consolidate new memories overnight and thus 
awakens every day believing it is the same morning of her accident. At first blush, Lucy is the 
eternally unattached one night stand of Henry’s dreams; it seems sensible to assume that long 
term commitment is basically inconceivable for someone who cannot retain new memories. To 
cope with the condition, Lucy’s father, brother, and even the staff at the Huki Lau Café go to 
great lengths to maintain Lucy’s reality and convince her that no time has passed. It is perhaps 
unsurprising then that Henry makes an unwelcome and disruptive entry into Lucy’s meticulously 
constructed and highly supervised life. Once Henry is banished from betting with the cook at the 
Huki Lau Café as to whether he can convince Lucy to have breakfast with him each morning, 
Henry tries his best to ‘meet’ Lucy elsewhere, staging elaborate scenarios on the side of the 
highway she drives every day. Lucy’s father, Marlin (Blake Clark), and brother, Doug (Sean 
Astin) inevitably learn of Henry’s activities and question his intentions. Nonetheless, because 
                                                
22 See conclusion for discussion of an exceptional documented case of amnesia with explicit ties 
to 50 First Dates.  
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Marlin figures that Lucy only sings on the days she meets Henry, Henry is ultimately able to 
convince them that their interactions are relatively harmless. As Henry’s feelings for Lucy begin 
to deepen, he creates a videotape meant to inform her of her memory condition and the notable 
world events she has missed in the past year, including a reenactment of their first meeting(s) in 
the Huki Lau Café. Henry’s video appears to be a great success as Lucy continues to watch some 
version of it – even recording some footage herself – every morning. The video allows Lucy to 
reconnect with old friends and also puts a stop to the elaborate routine previously required to 
protect her from the truth of her condition. More importantly, the video also functions to 
accelerate Lucy’s relationship with Henry as any romantic feelings she experiences are 
reinforced by the ‘evidence’ in the video. The narrative progresses rather smoothly from here 
until Lucy decides to end the relationship. What follows is a complex ‘deletion’ of Henry from 
Lucy’s technologically mediated memory, a period of separation during which Lucy lives at a 
psychiatric institute, and eventually a reunion of the romantic couple aided by Lucy’s father. 
On the whole, 50 First Dates privileges the role of analog technologies in memory 
processes and demonstrates a certain affection for the lo-fi. This chapter seeks to illustrate how 
the film configures the relationship between memory and technology. While films such as 
Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind, released in the same year as 50 First Dates, adopt a kind 
of DIY-sci-fi aesthetic in order to prod at contemporary anxieties about the status of memory and 
intimate relationships in the age of technology, 50 First Dates is disinterested in the eerier 
potential futures of technology in this vein. The more recent 2014 thriller, Before I Go to Sleep, 
examines the inherent dangers and easy manipulation in a similar case of overnight Groundhog-
Day-style amnesia, while such anxieties are at best implicit in 50 First Dates. The rom-com 
chooses instead to pit numerous technologies (with both analog and digital leanings) against each 
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other in a grand effort to overcome Lucy’s peculiar case of amnesia. As Henry and Lucy pursue 
their relationship, they employ various strategies (and various technologies) with sporadic 
success in order to create a kind of ongoing substitute memory for Lucy. Between painting, 
handicrafts, and diary writing towards the analog end of the spectrum and amateur home video 
cameras and laptop computers towards the digital, a key difference in efficacy emerges. 
Specifically, the film regards analog technologies, constructed as somehow closer to the body, as 
more trustworthy accounts of memory. As Kilbourn notes in his analysis of the representation of 
memory in Eternal Sunshine, “the point of all the ‘retro’-technology […] is that cassette tapes, 
photographs, notebooks and other ‘analog’ objects […] have had time […] to become naturalized 
as artificial memory devices; aides de memoires, charged – ‘cathected’ (to use Freud’s term) – 
with affective value.”23 It is this naturalization Kilbourn describes that draws analog technologies 
closer the realm of the human (and transposes whatever credibility may follow). Digital 
technologies, on the other hand, are regarded as newer and perhaps even more resistant to 
‘naturalization’ in this way. The implication here is that there is greater potential for 
manipulation with the use of digital technologies. Several examples of this logic will be 
investigated in further detail below, beginning with the film’s visualization of the analog through 
representation of place, then Marlin and Doug’s makeshift efforts, Henry’s video composition, 
the digitization of Lucy’s diary, and finally Lucy’s portraits of Henry even after he has been 
‘deleted’ from her diary. 
 
VISUALIZING THE ANALOG THROUGH PLACE 
                                                
23 Kilbourn, 132. 
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The two key locales of 50 First Dates illustrate the film’s presentation of memory as a 
conquerable territory. Firstly, the Hawaiian island on which the majority of the film is set 
functions as an exotic site of forgetting that is always already amnesiac – what representation 
there is of native Hawaiian heritage seems to work largely in service of the tourism industry 
while obfuscating colonial histories.24 Secondly, the vast arctic icescape of Alaska appears to 
literalize the tabula rasa model of memory put forth by the film in general and Lucy’s rare 
condition specifically. To begin discussion of Hawaii, scholars such as Janet Borgerson and 
Jonathan Schroeder,25 Jack Halberstam, Lisa Kahaleole Hall,26 and Houston Wood have noted 
how Hawaii tends to be scrubbed clean of its colonial past. Wood recalls a New York Times 
review of the 1966 Elvis vehicle, Paradise, Hawaiian Style, in order to emphasize how public 
audiences were growing canny to the portrayal of Hawaii as a kind of “tropical Disneyland.”27 
Such a phrase is particularly apt insofar as it weds two apparently contradictory elements of 
Hawaii’s appeal; Hawaii is a headily exotic ‘other’ space just as it is simultaneously sanitized, its 
danger mitigated precisely because while it is of the other, it does not belong to the other. 50 
First Dates is hardly sensitive in its portrayal of indigenous Hawaiians – Rob Schneider’s 
feckless Ula is a rather discouraging mess of cultural stereotypes. Ula’s characterization as a 
lazy, licentious, and eternally shirtless wayward ‘wingman’ corresponds with what Wood 
identifies as the colonialist preoccupation with a “rhetoric of debasement” that pervades in 
                                                
24 Bacchilega notes that Hawaii’s colonial history, though not necessarily sudden and violent, is 
punctuated by Hawaii’s forceful annexation to the U.S. at the end of the Nineteenth Century and 
the proceeding, and in many ways already-begun, process of Americanization (3-4). 
25 See Borgerson and Schroeder, “The Lure of Paradise: Marketing the Retro-Escape of Hawaii,” 
Time, Space, and the Market: Retroscapes Rising, Eds. Stephen Brown and John F. Sherry, 
Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2003, 219-252. 
26 See Hall, “Strategies of Erasure: U.S. Colonialism and Native Hawaiian Feminism,” American 
Quarterly 60.2 (2008): 273-280.  
27 Wood, 112. 
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narratives with a Hawaiian locale.28 The film repeatedly aligns Ula with a vague sense of native 
Hawaiian identity; in one exemplary scene, Ula functions as something of a madcap sideshow as 
he entertains a small group of Lucy’s friends at the beach with a ‘traditional’ hula song and 
dance in a banana leaf costume. For the most part, Ula embodies a certain ‘traditional’ Hawaiian 
imaginary that is subsequently associated with a kind of ill-fittedness for modern life. Indeed, the 
prevailing joke seems to be that Ula is embarrassingly and eccentrically out of place in modern 
American Hawaii, violating codes of behaviour in environments like weddings, golf courses, and 
various other ‘indoor’ spaces. Thus it becomes clear that the Hawaii of 50 First Dates descends 
from a troubling lineage of media representations29 of the state as an artificial ‘getaway’ 
destination with a rather ambivalent relationship to modernity. Ultimately, Hawaii’s sunny 
(dis)position outside of an imagined American modernity amounts to a kind of dislocating 
confusion that describes both the result and the necessary preconditions of its colonial amnesia 
onscreen. 
How does such a depiction of Hawaii function specifically for 50 First Dates? Halberstam 
argues, “50 First Dates utilizes Hawaii as a kind of blank slate, a place emptied of political 
turmoil and a perfect metaphor for the state of mind produced by the erasure of memory.”30 
Indeed, the erasure of Hawaii’s colonial history literalizes the kind of eternal sunshine of Lucy’s 
mind. This is only compounded by the film’s tendency to disregard the more troubling 
implications of Lucy’s vulnerability as a person whose most intimate personal history is in many 
                                                
28 Wood, 109-110. 
29 Other examples include The Descendants (Payne, 2011), Waikiki Wedding (Tuttle, 1937), Blue 
Hawaii (Taurog, 1961), and the particularly discouraging missionary-colonial narrative of 
Hawaii (Hill, 1966), adapted from James A. Michener’s novel of the same name, which 
constructs American Christian missionaries as a civilizing force against the threatening wildness 
of Hawaiian natives. 
30 Jack Halberstam, 76. 
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ways authored by Henry, who obviously has a vested interest in a particular interpretation of 
events. Moreover, in the most practical terms, the island’s rather unchangingly warm climate 
helps to mitigate the risk of Lucy noticing that an extraordinary amount of time has passed, 
seemingly overnight. The island is rendered almost perpetually soaked in sugary orange and pink 
sunlight, achieving a humidly heady atmosphere. The opening montage of 50 First Dates 
foregrounds this particular imagination of Hawaii as an intoxicating and beautiful place in which 
modern subjects can convalescence from the trauma of modern life.31 The title credits flicker 
wetly like a mirage over the image of a beachside sunset as Hawaiian steel guitar music washes 
over the scene. As the camera pans to the right to focus on a pineapple nestled in the sand, the 
beach scene is replaced by the same pineapple sitting on the counter of a suburban kitchen in 
which a young woman describes her dalliance with Henry to her companion. Through a large 
window we can see that snow is falling outside – clearly, we are no longer in paradise. What 
follows is a compilation of women (although Kevin James makes a brief cameo for a gag as yet 
another of Henry’s vacationing conquests) who have returned home from their Hawaiian 
vacations and their romantic escapades with Henry. The anecdotes are edited together quite 
rapidly such that the women finish each other’s sentences, drawing attention to both the trivial 
differences between otherwise generic weeklong romances and the hectic speed of city life in the 
‘modern’ U.S. The women of Henry’s past appear mostly in their places of work – a morgue, 
dentist’s office, beauty salon, generic office cubicles, etc. – surrounded by technological devices. 
Some relate their vacation fling with Henry to their co-workers, but many others are depicted 
talking on cellphones while going about their workday. Importantly, each woman is framed in a 
                                                
31 The more recent Forgetting Sarah Marshall (Stoller, 2008) is premised on such an 
understanding of the “Aloha State.” 
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decidedly technological, or at least vaguely artificial, environment. One woman working in a 
morgue chats on her cellphone as she uses a bone saw on the cadaver lying in front of her; there 
is a certain detachment from the task at hand that, while playing for laughs, consistently aligns 
modern urban life with a kind of alienation from the ‘natural’ world. In contrast to the decidedly 
urban, indoor, and concrete continental U.S., the women describe participating in adventurous 
outdoor activities such as scuba diving, hiking, and mountain climbing with Henry. Consistently, 
50 First Dates insists on a kind of essential difference between the continental U.S. and its island 
cousin. There is little sense that island life is particularly ‘technological.’ As discussed above, a 
vague sense of ‘modern life’ is repeatedly contrasted with an alternatively slower, simpler way 
of life in Hawaii. The film’s prologue makes this opposition abundantly clear – this is in addition 
to the subsequent foregrounding of Henry’s anxious desire to escape modern life and the threat 
of domestication posed by the prospect of a committed relationship. The fact that Henry’s 
Alaskan research voyage loiters in the background of this anxiety, standing in for the possibility 
of escape, will be explored in greater detail below. For now, it is important to emphasize that 
Henry’s Hawaiian lifeworld is circumscribed by expansive shots of open-air tropical paradise; it 
is a world of luaus, tikki bars, lush golf greens, and general leisure. Ultimately, in contrast to the 
Edenic naturalism of the Hawaii of 50 First Dates, the film’s urban U.S. is rendered in decidedly 
modern, technological, and almost claustrophobic terms. Hawaii thus becomes a stand-in for the 
analog while modern continental U.S. aligns itself with the ascension of technology in the digital 
age. 
The representation of Alaska in 50 First Dates, though ultimately similar in function, differs 
importantly from the film’s portrayal of Hawaii. Whereas Hawaii is saturated in candy-coloured 
sunlight, connoting a kind of fertile richness and kinetic energy, Alaska is starkly white and 
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peacefully still. As far as the film is concerned, Alaska is a kind of uncharted territory waiting to 
be discovered, populated only by the walruses Henry seeks to study – and even the walruses’ 
underwater life is relatively unknown. Henry’s journey to Alaska also bears a certain allegiance 
to gentleman-explorer narratives and settler-colonial histories of the U.S. Indeed, as Susan Kollin 
explains, “considered one of the world’s only remaining wilderness areas and one of its most 
popular tourist destinations, Alaska has been widely regarded as the ‘Last Frontier,’ a region 
whose history has yet to be written and whose ‘virgin lands’ have yet to be explored.”32 50 First 
Dates certainly participates in such an imagination of Alaska. The spectacularly vast whiteness 
of the icy landscape, highlighted in the film by sweeping high-angle shots, depicts the region 
quite literally as a blank slate, recalling the figurative description of Lucy’s memory that is 
repeated throughout the film. The supposed unspoiled ‘naturalness’ of the region, at least as 
presented in the film, furthers this association of Alaska with a kind of original neutrality, an 
innocent amenability to the powers of human and technological domination. This is precisely the 
kinship between the characterization of Alaska and the ‘blank slate’ model of Lucy’s memory, 
which casts Henry’s authorial intervention as an almost charitable act of service. Lucy, quite 
literally, lives in the past; it is precisely through (re)writing Lucy’s history in the compilation 
video that Henry endeavours to bring her into the present. The implication is that Henry works to 
‘fill in the blanks’ that would otherwise remain empty, or perhaps more correctly, inaccessible to 
him. Furthermore, Kollin’s emphasis on Alaska’s supposedly ‘unwritten’ history lends itself well 
to an analysis of 50 First Dates; Henry acts as something of an amateur author and archivist, 
sometimes quite literally writing Lucy’s personal history on her behalf. Accordingly, Henry’s 
performance as a ‘memory author’ is imbricated with certain colonialist impulses that work to 
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marginalize or erase any pre-existing historical narratives, all while positioning the ‘gentleman-
explorer’ as a paternalistic pioneer figure who generously brings history to the ‘blank slate.’ Just 
as the film situates Hawaii outside of the modern technologized world, there is also a sense that 
the technological age has yet to arrive in Alaska, though perhaps Henry could be the one to bring 
it. Ultimately, for 50 First Dates, Alaska stands in for both an escape from modern life and the 
untapped potentiality of ‘blank slates’ – that is, precisely the appealing duality of colonialism. 
 
DIY GROUNDHOG DAY 
50 First Dates foregrounds the centrality of material culture and technology to the 
construction and maintenance of Lucy’s inner life. We learn early on that Lucy’s father and 
brother, along with Sue and Nick at the Huki Lau Café, enable her to effectively relive the day of 
her accident every day. Since Lucy is not confined to the family home, certain efforts are 
required to ensure Lucy’s surroundings do not contradict her assumption that she is living a 
normal day more than a year ago. The ruse is maintained principally through consistency of her 
material conditions, particularly the objects and media that populate her daily life. Indeed, the 
film demonstrates the delicacy of Lucy’s illusory lifeworld when, to her disbelief, a policeman 
issues her a ticket for an expired license plate and she manages to find a newspaper reflecting the 
actual calendar date. From a certain perspective, it is material culture that poses the greatest 
threat to Lucy’s equilibrium. It is perhaps unsurprising then that Lucy’s father procured hundreds 
of copies of the morning newspaper from the day of her accident for Lucy to read. The family 
even celebrates Marlin’s birthday every evening complete with a cake that Lucy bakes each time. 
To avoid having to repeat the fateful drive to pick a pineapple that was their father-daughter 
tradition on Marlin’s birthday, they keep a large padlocked freezer full of pineapples to defrost 
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overnight. Marlin and Doug even whitewash the large walls of the workshop every night so that 
Lucy can paint her father a mural for his birthday every day – and presumably not be alarmed by 
a mural she has no recollection of painting. In a montage depicting these and other memory-
managing tactics, Marlin and Doug begin painting over Lucy’s latest mural and the camera 
reverses to position itself against the wall. As the men push the white rollers upwards, the paint 
blacks out the screen in slow strokes and the viewer’s position is aligned with Lucy, for whom 
this ‘black out’ is a permanent reality. Indeed, this moment contains a reverberation of the image 
of a “slate wiped clean” overnight that is repeated throughout the film by multiple characters 
describing Lucy’s condition. While Lucy’s slate certainly is ‘wiped clean’ as she sleeps, the 
success of the next day depends upon this cleaning up of the evidence of the day. This is to say 
that it is not enough that Lucy forgets overnight – the material traces of her memory must also be 
artificially ‘forgotten.’ 
The charade even extends to refilling shampoo bottles with an eyedropper and re-wrapping a 
VHS copy of The Sixth Sense, Lucy’s birthday present for her father. Apparently, they watch the 
film together most evenings. The family also watches a videotape of the same Vikings’ football 
game every day. Firstly, the montage sequence depicting these tasks, set cheekily to Paul 
McCartney’s “Another Day,” efficiently illustrates the elaborate routine Marlin and Doug 
concocted in order to manage Lucy’s condition. Secondly, it is worth noting that the film 
communicates the tedium of this arrangement largely through the re-viewing of video. Marlin 
and Doug complete most of the above tasks with a resigned yet deliberate attitude one would 
associate with common daily chores, but they are observably distressed when they must watch 
the Vikings game and The Sixth Sense. Re-viewing video in particular demonstrates the 
difference between the exhausted affective labour of Lucy’s family and her own innocent 
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entertainment. The implication here is that occupying the position of a viewer demands a certain 
performance of affect that the more menial tasks of memory management do not. More than a 
conventional call for spectatorial engagement, Marlin and Doug must perform viewership for 
Lucy’s benefit. Marlin and Doug’s exhaustive indulgence in Lucy’s predictable suggestion that 
they watch both the football game and the film reflects the extent to which media (perhaps 
especially film and television in this case) come to structure and punctuate our memories. In 
other words, these videos are the seemingly innocuous markers of the passage of time that have 
become essential milestones of Lucy’s day, every day; popular media has become the scaffolding 
of Lucy’s short-term, or rather twenty-four-hour-term, memory. Thus, from the beginning of the 
film, popular media and technological ‘memory’ devices (e.g. recorded broadcasts) are brought 
in to fill the role Lucy’s amnesia left vacant. In order to avoid confronting the truth of the matter, 
Lucy’s material surroundings and, importantly, her media environment, must also be made to 
forget on her behalf. 
Such a scenario gestures to the nascent process of externalizing Lucy’s memory that 
intensifies once Henry and, perhaps more significantly, the ‘memory video’ he makes for her, 
enters her life. It is precisely this externalization via mediatization of memory that lies at the 
heart of technophobic paranoia around the status of human memory in the digital age. In his 
discussion of the specificities of memory in the digital age, Hoskins refers to the externalization 
of memory facilitated by digital technologies when he contends, “today, memory […] is less a 
question of remembering and more a matter of where to look.”33 In addition to demonstrating a 
certain tendency to focus on memory in terms of storage, here Hoskins points out how the 
seemingly endless ‘archivability’ of the digital offers itself as something of a substitute for the 
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human brain’s capacity to remember. In the wake of this shifting of responsibility, 50 First Dates 
appears to insist on an essential dissonance between the biological human reality of inevitable 
decay and exhaustion on the the one hand, and the tireless repeatability of modern ‘recorded’ 
media on the other. It is also important to note that a certain logic from the realm of video games 
underpins both Lucy’s amnesia and her family’s efforts to manage the condition. As Warren 
Buckland notes in his study of the intersections of video games and cinema, one of the most 
common conventions of video games is “the serialized repetition of actions (to accumulate points 
and master the rules).”34 It is through such serialized repetition that Marlin and Doug ‘master the 
rules’ of Lucy’s lifeworld, maintaining tight authorial control in order to prevent Lucy from 
discovering the reality of her amnesia. In fact, narratives of ‘overnight’ amnesia have 
proliferated in films since the advent of first-person video games in which avatars ‘die’ only to 
be immediately reborn and repeat the scenario a virtually unlimited number of times in order to 
eventually ‘get it right.’ Mick Jackson’s Clean Slate (1994) stages a kind of screwball 
predecessor to Memento in which Dana Carvey plays Maurice L. Pogue, an amnesiac detective 
who must rely on tape recorders and potential imposters in order to solve the mystery of a crime 
he seems to be caught up in. Able to preserve his progress only through external memory aides, 
Maurice otherwise starts afresh each morning. As Baxendale notes, Clean Slate marked a shift in 
contemporary amnesia films – that is, the representation of a model of memory loss in which the 
amnesiac can retain information for twenty-four hours, only to forget it all overnight.35 The more 
recent 2014 thriller, Before I Go to Sleep, examines the same psychological phenomenon from a 
different generic perspective. As a result of a traumatic head injury, Christine (Nicole Kidman) 
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can only remember new information for 24 hours before losing her memory of her life since the 
early 1990s. By creating a home video diary, Christine begins to both rebuild her memory on her 
terms and investigate the narrative of her past that her husband (or, rather, the man who claims to 
be her husband) has constructed for her. While some days Christine gets closer to the truth than 
others, in an approximation of the multiple lives convention, each morning she must start from 
scratch. Similarly, Lucy’s life at the outset of the film borrows from the video game convention 
of multiple lives; Marlin and Doug (and later Henry) are able to perfect their routine over time 
through the daily do-overs afforded by Lucy’s amnesia. Marlin admits he is troubled about what 
will eventually happen once Lucy wakes to find that her face has aged ten years seemingly 
overnight – undoubtedly a horribly traumatic way to start the day, every day. Here 50 First Dates 
encourages us to regard Lucy’s life with her father and brother as a kind of quaint, but ultimately 
flawed temporary solution. As indicated above, such a predicament insists on an unassailable 
process of bodily decay over time in contrast with the endlessly repeatable, yet ageless, temporal 
structure common to video games and imagined to describe the digital more generally.36 This is 
to say that from the beginning, 50 First Dates gestures to a kind of ultimate and fundamental 
impotence of technologically mediated memory, which cannot imitate its ‘natural’ human 
counterpart perfectly enough. By detailing the DIY deception Marlin and Doug perform each 
night, and Lucy’s situation at the outset at the outset of the film, I hope to have made a case for 
the centrality of material culture to the management of Lucy’s amnesia. Furthermore, I hope to 
have begun to sketch out the film’s implicit allegiance to a model of ‘natural’ human memory, 
or, as we will come to define it, subconscious embodied memory. 
                                                
36 Doane’s analysis of the “dream of dematerialization” associated with the digital will be 
discussed in greater detail below. 
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A VIDEO LOVE LETTER 
Material culture continues to play a central role both for Lucy’s memory condition 
specifically and for the development of her romantic relationship with Henry, which is the actual 
focus of the film. After witnessing the disastrous scene in which Lucy accidentally discovers the 
truth of her condition and its implications for her family, Henry creates a multi-purpose 
videotape that depicts notable events in the news and popular culture, explains briefly Lucy’s 
memory loss, and demonstrates her connection to Henry by way of a reenactment of their ‘first’ 
meeting(s), captured by Ula’s children on a home video camera. The video compilation is very 
much of its time, exploiting many stylized editing ‘effects’ recognizable from early video editing 
software such as animated slideshow style transitions, and short lines of text meant to annotate 
the content on screen. These effects also call attention to a kind of directorial hand, in this case 
Henry’s arrangement of popular news items and more personal stories relating directly to Lucy’s 
life. In a sense, Henry’s video adopts the form of a love letter; quite simply, it is addressed 
explicitly to Lucy from Henry. Through both text and audio-visual recording, Henry’s authorial 
voice becomes a kind of multi-channel iteration. As the Beach Boys’ “Wouldn’t It Be Nice” 
begins to play, titles appear on the screen addressing Lucy by name and assuring her that 
“everything is going to be ok…but here are some things you missed this year...” These titles 
continue to punctuate some of the more sensational news stories, such as Arnold 
Schwarzenegger’s election, Martha Stewart’s legal troubles, and Snoop Dogg’s decision to stop 
smoking marijuana one month before his decision to start smoking marijuana once again. One 
such news story plays footage of a baseball game with a headline claiming “Red Sox Win World 
Series,” followed by a quick intertitle reading “just kidding.” Here Henry’s video acknowledges, 
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however subtly, how easily such a video could be manipulated. Indeed, the video could 
conceivably be as deceptive as Marlin and Doug’s pre-existing protective routine. Nonetheless, 
Henry’s text in the video ultimately functions to establish the trustworthiness of his own 
authorial voice. He jokes, but promptly reveals he was “just kidding.” It is worth noting that 
when Lucy sees this first incarnation of the video, she has been unable to contribute any footage 
of herself or from her perspective; her voice is absented. Perhaps in anticipation of this 
imbalance, Henry includes in the video brief messages from Sue and Nick; Sue takes the 
opportunity to assure Lucy that Henry is “okay,” acting as a kind of character witness for Henry. 
Nestled between the compilation of media events and the ‘testimonials’ of Lucy’s longtime 
family friends, Henry’s appeal to Lucy attempts to draw a sense of credibility from these trusted 
sources. Philosophers such as Žižek have noted how mechanisms of credibility have come to be 
articulated in the wake of the digital. Žižek asserts, “today, with the new digitalized technologies 
enabling perfectly faked documentary images, not to mention Virtual Reality, the injunction 
‘Believe my words (argumentation), not the fascination of your eyes!’ is more pertinent than 
ever.”37 Žižek likens this situation to the viewing experience of a contemporary film that relies 
significantly on computer-generated-images or ‘special effects;’ we know what we are seeing is 
not precisely a filmed or recorded event, yet we opt to immerse ourselves within the diegesis 
anyway. In viewing Henry’s video for the first (of many ‘firsts’) time, Lucy finds herself in a 
similar position; she knows how easily such a video could be manipulated or even completely 
fabricated, to say nothing of the farcical ‘reenactment,’ yet she chooses to believe a kind of 
essential truth behind the constructed video – that is, that she and Henry are falling in love. It is 
Henry’s inclusion of the news items mentioned above that playfully prods at this desire for 
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credibility, albeit rife with misplaced nostalgia, that is virtually impossible to satisfy in the digital 
age.  
Once the video begins to explain why Lucy cannot remember any of the news events shown 
onscreen, we are no longer privy to the sounds of the Beach Boys. Instead, the viewer is 
implicated in Lucy’s emotional experience as the camera oscillates between Lucy’s tearful face 
and the video. We hear a crescendo of delicate non-diegetic solo piano, melancholy strings, and 
sweeping woodwinds. Soon afterwards Henry’s voice, coming from the video, rejoins the 
soundscape as he proceeds to guide Lucy through a reenactment of the day they met. The film 
seems to propose that it is preferable or somehow less traumatic for Lucy to discover the truth in 
this way, as a viewer, than the accidental discoveries (such as the expired license plate fiasco) 
that inevitably occur if she continues living the fantasy Marlin and Doug construct for her. 
Positioned as a viewer, it as though Lucy is able to achieve a degree of detachment from the 
story on screen, which is of course intensely personal to her. The substitution and subsequent 
reintegration of the melodramatic score with the diegetic sound from the video encourages us to 
regard Lucy’s experience of watching the video in distinctly cinematic terms. In this way both 
Lucy and the viewer are prompted to accept the specific narrative put forth by the video on its 
own terms, even though it obviously has immense implications for Lucy personally. Put 
differently, Lucy’s (and the viewer’s) cinematic experience of Henry’s video borrows a kind of 
persuasiveness from cinematic convention. As Mary Ann Doane reminds us, “it is not as if we 
believe cinema presents us with ‘realistic’ representation of objects or people but that […] it 
points to and verifies an existence.”38 Of course, here Doane is concerned with the medium 
specificity of celluloid film and not digital video. Nonetheless, I would argue that, in the context 
                                                
38 Doane, 146. 
 35 
of 50 First Dates, this is precisely the function Henry’s video is meant to perform; it ‘points to 
and verifies’ not just the facts of Lucy’s condition, which are difficult to dispute, but the status of 
his relationship with Lucy, which is almost impossible to prove. Furthermore, the video descends 
from a lineage of amateur home video connoting private family life, spontaneity, candour, and a 
kind of truth-telling capability. Pseudo-anthropological in nature, home video purports to depict 
domestic humans ‘in the wild.’ As Patricia Zimmermann notes, “in the popular imaginary, home 
movies are often defined by negation: noncommercial, nonprofessional, unnecessary.”39 It is 
precisely from such a supposedly uncompromised characterization that Henry’s video is meant to 
gain its credibility. The apparent success of Henry’s video in helping Lucy live what is depicted 
as a fuller, happier life also partakes in a particular understanding of cinema’s effectiveness in 
mental processes. Elsaesser identifies this pervasive view as, “the idea that films are not simply 
exterior objects whose reception covers a limited time span and which ‘disappear,’ so to speak, 
after that, but rather that films, once seen, continue to live in us and can haunt and influence us in 
much the same manner as past memories or actual experiences.”40 It is worthwhile to pause here 
in order to consider a rather remarkable realization of Elsaesser’s argument that relates directly 
to 50 First Dates. While Baxendale maintains, as a clinical neuropsychologist, that an amnesiac 
condition like Lucy’s is unknown to medicine,41 researchers Christine Smith et al. note a unique 
case in which a patient, “FL,” exhibited a nearly identical form of memory loss. However, 
researchers actually attribute FL’s psychosomatic condition to 50 First Dates, which was 
released 15 months before the vehicular accident that supposedly caused her condition.42 FL 
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admits that Drew Barrymore is her favourite actress and that she has viewed the film several 
times since the onset of her condition, but insists that she did not see the film before her accident; 
even so, the researchers involved in her case suggest that FL likely could have had knowledge of 
the film’s premise.43 Here we encounter a rather extraordinary demonstration of ‘cinema’s 
effectiveness,’ to recall Elsaesser’s phrasing. Despite FL’s memory loss, 50 First Dates 
continues to haunt her amnesiac present in a way that appears to inform the manifestation of her 
symptoms. Within the diegesis of 50 First Dates, it is this ‘haunting’ function of video, 
experienced cinematically, that is put to work in the (re)construction of Lucy’s subjectivity in the 
actual present.  
The content of the first version of the video described above contrasts with what we see of 
the final version of the video in the epilogue of 50 First Dates. In the film’s final scene, Lucy 
awakes to view a version of the video that begins with the news of her accident before a montage 
of significant personal events informs Lucy (and us) that years have passed since the previous 
scene and the couple have since married. The particularities of Lucy’s situation in the epilogue 
will be discussed in greater detail below, but for now it is important simply to note that once it is 
possible for Lucy to participate in the video, by recording and/or appearing in the footage 
herself, the documentation of media events falls out of the video. This significant discrepancy 
between the first and final versions of the video underlines the differing strategies of each. In the 
case of the first video, introduced when Lucy is still living in Hawaii with her family who could 
potentially confirm or deny the content of the video, Henry works to establish his credibility as 
the author of Lucy’s memory. The final version of the video, however, is no longer preoccupied 
with establishing Henry’s credibility as an author through popular news media or the testimony 
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of Lucy’s trusted friends. Instead, Lucy is convinced of her own history through a home video 
compilation consisting almost entirely of moments from her relationship with Henry. The 
landscape of Lucy’s memory, like that of Alaska, is now isolated from the rest of the world – the 
video jettisons any other authorial voices that might complicate or even contradict Henry’s 
account of Lucy’s memory. Overall, it is clear that the video’s material circumstances and 
Lucy’s cinematic viewing experience are central to the video’s successful substitution of Lucy’s 
memory. If we understand memory to be a crucial component of subjectivity, it follows that the 
video becomes not simply an aid for Lucy’s daily functioning, but a pillar of her sense of self. It 
is here that we arrive at the scenario that occupies much of the technophobic paranoia around life 
in the digital age – that is, when our identities becomes dispersed and we cease to be fully 
ourselves without our external technological aids. Put differently, Lucy’s inevitable dependence 
on Henry’s video, albeit sans a strictly literal fusion of the human body and intelligent machine, 
stages a version our collective cyborgian nightmare. 
The substitution via externalization of Lucy’s memory (without actual input from Lucy) 
represented by Henry’s video speaks to broader contemporary cultural anxieties surrounding 
both the potentiality and the increasing centrality of technological devices to our daily lives. Ten 
years later, Richard Glatzer and Wash Westmoreland’s Still Alice (2014), a film that follows 
from the titular character’s diagnosis of early onset Alzheimer’s Disease, represents a similar 
cluster of concerns. Alice (Julianne Moore) is sent into a panic when she cannot find her iPhone, 
which houses all of her necessary scheduling reminders and, crucially, a list of simple questions 
she has written for herself to answer each morning, such as “What is the name of your oldest 
daughter?” In preparation for the decline of her cognitive abilities, Alice orchestrates a series of 
instructions to be triggered once her future self can no longer answer her daily questions. Not 
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wishing to continue living past this point, Alice records a video for herself that will guide her 
through her own suicide. One of the tragedies of the narrative occurs when it becomes clear that 
Alice’s iPhone is lost for good, rendering her virtually powerless as her health and cognitive 
capacity continue to deteriorate; crucially, with the deterioration of Alice’s memory comes the 
withering away of her identity. The implication here is that once we may no longer choose for 
ourselves the extent to which our identities are propped up by external technological devices, it 
may become quite literally a matter of life and death of both the body and soul. Of course, this is 
an example of dependence upon technologically mediated memory pushed to its logical extreme. 
Nonetheless, it is useful insofar as it reveals the precarity of such a dependence on technology 
beyond the technophobic futurism of science fiction. Indeed, Still Alice, like 50 First Dates, 
insists simultaneously (and rather innocently) on the unassailable and fragile temporality of the 
human body and its privileged link to a form of memory and an identity that cannot be housed 
elsewhere, that cannot be preserved through technological mediation. 
 
DIGITIZING/DELETING A DIARY 
In an approximation of the higher-tech memory erasure technique represented in films such 
as the pseudo-medical procedure offered by Lacuna Inc. in Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless 
Mind, the technologically sophisticated and contractually obligatory erasure in Paycheck, and the 
futuristic military implantation (and later commercial/recreational intervention) depicted in Total 
Recall, 50 First Dates stages something of an artificial memory erasure well beyond Marlin and 
Doug’s nightly whitewashing. This occurs when Lucy decides to digitize her handwritten diary 
on a laptop computer in order to remove all memories of Henry, functionally ‘un-doing’ their 
relationship. This pivotal scene is relevant to this project in two particular ways, for two related 
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yet distinct questions we may ask of the film. The first, which I will discuss directly, examines 
the notions of trace and signature; how does the film understand and represent the faculty of 
analog versus digital technologies – that is, a handwritten diary versus a laptop – to supplement 
and document Lucy’s memory? The second extends this logic of credibility in order to 
investigate the stakes of this scene for questions of authorship; to what extent does the 
digitization of Lucy’s diary render her most personal memories vulnerable to manipulation by 
other authorial voices? Tabling the latter question for now, it is important firstly to work through 
the implications of this scene for our understanding of how analog and digital technologies are 
made to function in 50 First Dates. 
As mentioned above, at first Henry’s video appears to be a great success. Lucy evidently 
watches some version of it every morning as she and Henry continue to see each other. It is only 
later that we learn Lucy has been keeping her own account of events in a diary complete with 
sketches, pressed flowers, and other mementos from her ‘first’ date(s) with Henry. Lucy tells 
Henry that relying solely on his videotapes left her feeling, rather appropriately, that she was 
being told about her life from someone else’s point of view. Eventually, believing that she is 
holding Henry back from living a full life, Lucy decides that she no longer wishes to continue 
with the relationship. The film encourages us to read this scene as something of a romantic, if 
tragic, gesture of love. It is because Lucy loves Henry that she insists on their separation; she 
views their relationship as a barrier to his plans for an Alaskan research voyage. Having recorded 
her own experience of daily events in her diary, Lucy asks Henry to read what she wrote about 
him before helping her delete all traces of their relationship. Significantly, this process of what 
we might call selective memory consolidation or else selective memory erasure is essentially a 
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process of digitization. Lucy and Henry use a computer to transpose Lucy’s analog practice of 
diary writing into a word document on her laptop.  
It is worth lingering on the material conditions of this scene. As a handwritten paper 
document, Lucy’s diary bears an indexical relationship to herself – or, more precisely, to the 
physical act of writing. The sketches and decorative elements Lucy included in the margins of 
each page personalize the entries and perform a kind of evidentiary function for Lucy’s affective 
experience of the events beyond alphabetic language. This analog practice of documenting her 
memories each day contrasts importantly with the subsequent process of digitization. The 
implication here is that the diary is somehow less true in digital form, or at least its manipulation 
is virtually undetectable. As Lucy’s original diary bears an indexical relationship to her act of 
writing, the diary acquires an air of credibility that is much more difficult to achieve via digital 
technologies. As Doane explains, “The index makes that claim [verification of an existence] by 
virtue of its privileging of contact, of touch, of a physical connection. The digital can make no 
such claim and, in fact, is defined as its negation […] a medium without materiality.”44 Here 
Doane distinguishes two definitions of the index, trace and deixis, apropos of Charles Sanders 
Peirce. The first definition of the index as trace corresponds to the footprint or the photograph in 
which “something of the object leaves a legible residue through the medium of touch.”45 As 
Doane makes clear, this understanding of the index as trace, as a reproduction of a past moment, 
also foregrounds the linear temporal relationship between the object and the moment it indexes. 
The second definition of the index as deixis (often forgotten in discourses around photography 
and film) is exemplified by the pointing finger, or, “the ‘this’ of language.”46 In this second case, 
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the pointing finger embodies what Doane calls a “mandatory emptiness,”47 traceless and 
meaningful only insofar as it refers backwards to the thing itself. In the case of 50 First Dates, 
the film tends to align analog technologies such as Lucy’s handwritten diary with the function of 
the index as trace, whereas digital technologies such as the laptop computer are associated with 
the index as deixis. It is this ‘mandatory emptiness’ of Lucy’s digitized diary that challenges its 
credibility as a source or substitution of Lucy’s memory; for 50 First Dates, the remoteness of 
the technology and its trustworthiness are inversely correlated. Here, if one forgives the analogy, 
we may draw new meaning from the idiom “I trust you as far as I can throw you” – that is, once 
technological memory devices exceed the bounds of touch, they exceed the bounds of trust. 
Doane argues that today, we imagine that the digital has obliterated the notion of a medium 
and, instead, “we tend to think of a medium as a material or technical means of aesthetic 
expression (painting, sculpture, photography, film, etc.).”48 Such an assumption enables what 
Doane calls “film fetishism” to construct a division between celluloid and the digital “based on a 
supposedly privileged indexicality to the real, referentiality, and materiality.”49 This is precisely 
the logic that underlies the hierarchical organization of technologies along the analog/digital 
spectrum in 50 First Dates. Indeed, we tend to believe there is no mechanically indexical 
relationship between the lettered keys on a computer keyboard and the characters reflected on the 
computer-generated word document. We could productively even oppose the computer keyboard 
to the typewriter; for example, the force with which one punches the keys on a typewriter 
corresponds with the letter produced in ink on the page. The more pronounced kind of self-
signature embedded in Lucy’s analog diary is diminished in the process of digitization. The 
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words that were once recognizably her own could conceivably now have come from other 
authorial sources; indeed, it is Henry and not Lucy who is shown entering the selected passages 
of Lucy’s diary into the computer. Through the phenomenon of amnesia, 50 First Dates 
foregrounds the often overlooked centrality of authorship in memory processes. Lisa Gitelman’s 
analysis of player pianos as part of the prehistory of computing illustrates how discourses around 
the analog versus the digital have long been caught up in a rhetoric of authenticity. She asserts, 
“the specifics of materiality continue to matter much more to authors, to publishers, to ‘labels’ – 
that is, to potential owners – than they ever can, could, or will to listeners.”50 Here Gitelman 
helps to pinpoint the importance of materiality to the technologies used to stand in for Lucy’s 
faulty memory – this is to say, an investment in materiality seems inevitably inflected by a 
preoccupation with authorship and a certain crisis of authenticity imagined to circumscribe the 
immateriality of the digital age. Of course, as Doane rightly points out, the alignment of the 
digital with immateriality on the one hand and the conflation of the analog or indexical (as trace) 
with referentiality, are more or less equally fantastical.51 Nonetheless, 50 First Dates is 
emblematic of the persistent popular belief that our ability to exert authorial control over our 
memories – that is, to act as effective gatekeepers of the content of our mediatized memories – is 
somehow compromised in the digital domain, no matter who may be authoring on our behalf.  
 
LUCY’S (SELF-)PORTRAITURE 
The film’s engagement with analog and digital technologies in terms of their function in 
memory processes comes to a head in what will be the final scene discussed in this chapter. It is 
                                                
50 Gitelman, 214. 
51 Doane, “The Indexical…,” 143. 
 43 
here that 50 First Dates articulates most clearly its stakes in two distinct models of memory – 
that is, subconscious embodied memory aligned with the analog and technologically mediated 
memory associated with the digital. The scene in question stages Henry and Lucy’s reunion 
sometime after Lucy ends the relationship and erases Henry from her memory by amending and 
digitizing her diary. At first it seems that Lucy successfully erased Henry. Subsequent to the 
deletion via digitization of the diary, Henry glimpses Lucy at the marine park with her class from 
the institute where she now lives and works as an art teacher. They lock eyes, but it is clear Lucy 
does not recognize him as her former lover. However, in the film’s penultimate scene we 
discover that Lucy has been unable to completely eradicate Henry from what we understand to 
be her subconscious. As Marlin comes to see Henry off on his trip to Alaska, he mentions to 
Henry that Lucy is doing quite well at the institute and she has even starting singing again. He 
also gives Henry a Beach Boys cd featuring the classic “Wouldn’t It Be Nice,” a meaningful 
song in Henry and Lucy’s relationship. Not long into Henry’s voyage, as “Wouldn’t It Be Nice” 
blasts in the background, a brief flashback to Marlin mentioning that Lucy would sing only on 
the days she met Henry brings him to a realization – evidenced by the fact that Lucy has started 
singing again – that she remembers him.  
It is worth pausing to emphasize the circumstances of Henry’s epiphany that lead to his 
reunion with Lucy. Lucy’s singing functions as a manifestation of her subconscious embodied 
memory of Henry; indeed, it is Marlin who makes the connection between Lucy’s encounters 
with Henry and her singing in the first place while Lucy remains blissfully and tone-deafly 
unaware. While Lucy was able to erase Henry from her conscious memory by excising him from 
her diary, it seems she was unable to remove the more elusive connection between her happier 
experiences with Henry and her joyful a cappella renditions of “Wouldn’t It Be Nice.” Here 
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Lucy’s voice functions as a kind of intangible bridge between her memory and the present. As 
Mladen Dolar maintains in his investigation of the voice, “[the voice’s] positivity is extremely 
elusive – just the vibrations of air which vanish as soon as they are produced, a pure passing, not 
something that could be fixed or something that one could hold on to.”52 Dolar’s characterization 
of the voice here is significant insofar as it pinpoints a simultaneous materiality and invisibility; 
the voice is always something of a non-presence that fleetingly occupies space nonetheless. It is 
in this sense that the voice becomes a kind of analog technology that is particularly resistant to 
memory erasure by virtue of its enigmatic connection to the body. In other words, Lucy’s singing 
voice reverberates from her subconscious embodied memory. In Barthes’ essay “The Grain of 
the Voice,” he insists on the erotic connection between the voice and the listener by virtue of the 
bodily traces, or ‘grain,’ that can identify the speaker (or singer in Lucy’s case). To recall 
Barthes phrasing (albeit in translation), the ‘grain’ is “the materiality of the body speaking its 
mother tongue; perhaps the letter, almost certainly significance.”53 This uniquely identifiable 
trace of the voice is significant to Lucy’s situation because it bears a privileged connection to her 
psyche as opposed to Henry’s authorial voice embedded in his past forays into videography. It 
follows that Lucy’s singing voice may be productively understood in terms of the index as trace, 
apropos of Doane. Indeed, it is through the voice’s semi-tactile and immediate relationship to the 
body that it performs its function of verification. Put differently, Lucy’s voice becomes a 
credible source of memory by way of its essential bodily materiality. 
Once back on dry land, Henry rushes to the psychiatric institute where Lucy lives and works, 
but Lucy has no idea who he is. By way of recuperating the thud of this anticlimax, Lucy leads 
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Henry to her art studio where paintings, charcoal sketches, a clay bust, and watercolours of 
Henry’s likeness clutter the walls. As the camera glides delicately across the room to reveal 
dozens of Henry’s portraits, it lingers on a larger canvas depicting a man in a Hawaiian shirt with 
a large cracked egg in place of his head, which is notable beyond its parody of Magritte’s “The 
Son of Man.” The resemblance between Adam Sandler’s head and an egg is not only a running 
gag in the film, but also something of an inside joke in Henry and Lucy’s relationship. 
Significantly, even this smaller, more intimate detail has managed to survive in Lucy’s 
subconscious. Inferring from the prolificacy of Lucy’s portraiture, this residual memory can be 
elucidated consistently through artistic practice when it cannot otherwise find expression. Of 
course, this privileging of analog artistic media also reveals a rather conservative understanding 
of artistic practice; the film seems to partake in a certain imagination of the artist as a kind of 
medium herself, a technology that carries out the demands of artistic inspiration often relegated 
to the unconscious. The implication here is that through their access to the unconscious, analog 
media such as painting, drawing, and sculpture maintain a profound connection to the model of 
embodied memory put forth by the film. It is important to emphasize that this embodied memory 
is also subconscious; although Lucy reveals that she dreams about Henry almost every night, she 
has no intellectual understanding of who Henry may be nor why this stranger’s face appears so 
frequently in her dreams. Indeed, what she seems to remember is more of an image or essence of 
Henry than an episodic memory of actual events. Similarly, in Total Recall, Hauser’s (Arnold 
Schwarzenegger) memory is erased and a new identity (complete with false memories) is 
implanted in his brain, yet the film opens within his dreamscape – a dream that draws from his 
subconscious embodied memory of his actual past life, centered on Melina, his former lover. 
Paralleling Lucy’s miraculous ability to remember Henry’s image, it appears that memories of 
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love resist amnesia by virtue of their location in subconscious embodied memory. Indeed, 
popular belief in a link between dreams and the subconscious, Freud notwithstanding, 
encourages us to understand that a remnant of Lucy’s memories of Henry persists somewhere in 
the depths of her subconscious. There is also a certain purity to Lucy’s subconscious memory, 
realized through artistic practice. As noted, the memory that survives is not exactly one of 
precision, but of essence, perhaps even of love itself; thus, we are led to regard Lucy’s surviving 
memory of Henry as perhaps more essentially truthful than even her diary, especially in its 
digitized form.  
We may contrast Lucy’s subconscious embodied memory, the power of which is revealed in 
the film’s final moments, with her technologically mediated memory represented by her digitized 
diary and Henry’s videos. 50 First Dates is clear in its insistence on technologically mediated 
memory’s vulnerability to manipulation; indeed, the film demonstrates how easily Lucy’s 
memory can be manipulated by Henry as well as her father and brother. Conversely, 
subconscious embodied memory, as exemplified by Lucy’s artistically realized memory of 
Henry, is idealized for its supposed resistance to meddling by other authors. Here 50 First Dates 
reflects, perhaps most obviously, its stakes in anxious discourses around the status of human 
memory in the digital age. As Bruno Latour asserts, modernity insists on an artificial ontological 
distinction between inanimate objects and human subjects when in actuality, apropos of Michel 
Serres, “quasi-objects” and “quasi–subjects” proliferate.54 The bifurcated model of memory that 
emerges from my analysis of 50 First Dates is one such example of this stubborn modern 
affirmation of the essential separation of a ‘natural’ human state and ‘unnatural’ technology. 
While objects and human subjects may have a productive working relationship, so to speak, 
                                                
54 Latour, 10-11. 
 47 
technologically mediated memory is understood to be fundamentally unable to substitute its 
‘natural’ human counterpart. From this perspective, the circumstances surrounding the couple’s 
reunion in the art studio reaffirm two of the film’s key logics. Firstly, Lucy’s artwork reflects the 
film’s broader affection for analog technologies by virtue of their greater proximity to 
subconscious embodied memory. Secondly, the conditions of the couple’s reconciliation 
literalizes the film’s conceptualization of love as a kind of ultimate and decidedly analog 
technology of memory – one that resists both amnesia and technological mediation. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Beyond merely privileging the analog in a nostalgic gesture, the hierarchical organization 
of memory technologies in 50 First Dates delineates perhaps the most important divisions in the 
film. By demarcating differences between the analog and digital when it comes to the utility of 
technology in memory processes, the film also constructs the aforementioned opposition between 
technologically mediated memory and subconscious embodied memory. 50 First Dates tends to 
encourage us to regard the latter as something of a purer register, a position this chapter neither 
supports nor disputes. What is interesting about the film’s bifurcated view of memory is that 
analog technologies are shown to be able to access and extract Lucy’s subconscious embodied 
memory whereas digital technologies are not. Moreover, in the case of subconscious embodied 
memory, memory itself becomes the more powerful entity – Lucy’s body becomes a kind of 
medium for the realization of her ‘pure’ memory. In this way the film insists implicitly on an 
almost mystical importance of subconscious embodied memory that is fundamentally opposed to 
substitution by the technologically mediated (and primarily digital) alternative. For 50 First 
Dates, this imagination of a largely subconscious embodied memory is perhaps the analog par 
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excellence. As we increasingly live our lives with and through digital technologies in the age of 
the Internet, 50 First Dates illustrates a concurrent desire to reassert the virtues of the analog, 
imagined to be less complicated and suspect, grounded as it is in its material circumstances. 
Relating to this point, Doane observes a longing for “the certitude of the imprint, the trace, the 
etching in a medium whose materiality is thinkable,” which “reveals more readily than the 
digital, with its dream of immateriality, the inescapable necessity of matter, despite its inevitable 
corrosion, decay, and degeneration.”55 By detailing 50 First Dates’ hierarchical taxonomy of 
analog and digital technologies in this chapter, I hope to have made clear that it is upon this 
‘inescapable necessity of matter’ that the film insists. 
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Chapter II 
My Private Alaska: 




Now that we have an understanding of how 50 First Dates configures the relationship 
between memory and different sorts of technologies, it is important to consider more precisely 
the larger implications of the dyadic model of memory represented in the film. Specifically, this 
chapter seeks to answer the following questions: to what extent does technologically mediated 
memory open itself up to other authorial voices? If we oppose this model of memory to a kind of 
subconscious embodied memory, as the film encourages us to, what sort of power dynamics 
emerge? The question of authorship is central both to the film’s engagement with memory and to 
contemporary anxieties around the status of human memory in a technological age. Indeed, the 
film offers a valuable prism through which to consider these broader issues by staging the 
convergence of memory, technology, and authorship. Lucy’s memory constitutes the site of this 
convergence insofar as the technologies used to manage or overcome her amnesia are essentially 
the technologies of other authors. The previous chapter’s examination of the role of these analog 
and digital technologies in memory processes articulated the significance of their material 
circumstances, linking their differing relationships to the body to the success of their 
interventions into Lucy’s memory. My emphasis on the perceived trustworthiness of objects such 
as reprinted newspapers, handwritten diaries, computer-generated documents, and home videos 
will now be extended to the larger implications of the participatory turn in contemporary 
memory processes. Here I interrogate the film’s engagement with what it means to be the author 
of our own, or perhaps more importantly, someone else’s memory through technology. Firstly, 
this chapter works through the power dynamics of memory authorship as represented by Lucy’s 
ultimate situation in Alaska. Secondly, I discuss the extent to which the authorial body that 
emerges from a model of subconscious embodied memory is perhaps always already gendered. 
Next, this chapter examines the significance of sleep both to my analysis of the authorial body in 
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50 First Dates and to sociopolitical anxieties of the digital age. In the fourth section, I consider 
how the film imagines the figure of an ethical other, an onlooker of memory exemplified by 
Ula’s children, who seem to be constantly recording the events at hand on a video camera in the 
background. Building from an analysis of Ula’s children, this chapter concludes with an 
investigation of how observation is thematized more broadly in the film. Overall, this chapter 
aims to explain how the film’s representation of the role of technology in memory processes is 
symptomatic of contemporary cultural concerns over the crisis of authorship in the digital age. 
The question of authorship is important to an analysis of 50 First Dates largely because 
Lucy’s memory condition renders her in an acutely vulnerable position. Her self-determination is 
possible only to the extent that she may act as the author of her memory, involved in the re-
writing of her ‘lost time.’ While surely Lucy’s memory loss necessitates some degree of 
(re)writing, the film never quite addresses why Lucy herself could not be that author; although at 
one point we see Lucy filming Henry while she asks him if he loves her, there is never an 
indication that this footage makes it into the final cut of the video. In fact, as indicated in Chapter 
I when Lucy decides to cut ties with Henry, she explains that she kept her diary secret because 
the video left her feeling that she was learning about her life from someone else’s point of view. 
Also mentioned previously with regards to Henry’s first video, Elsaesser describes a pervasive 
notion of cinema’s effectiveness – that is, films as not purely external objects, but as components 
of subject and identity formation. 56 It is worth noting that Elsaesser characterizes such a view as 
emblematic of film censorship. 57 What is remarkable about Elsaesser’s observation for the 
purposes of this chapter is that it illustrates the connection between control and the powerful role 
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of cinema in memory processes. It seems that from the beginning, technological interventions in 
memory have been regarded opportunistically by those who would like to censor, or otherwise 
author the content that lives on in, or ‘haunts,’ the mind. This powerful position of the censor 
finds its analog in Henry who curates and constructs Lucy’s narrative for her to experience as a 
cinematic viewer. As Henry acknowledges in his first video, when he (re)encounters Lucy at the 
Huki Lau Café, her reaction to him varies each day – she actually rejects his overtures on many 
occasions. This variability in Lucy’s acceptance of Henry is ostensibly overcome with the 
introduction of Henry’s video, as Henry’s narrative of a successful romance supplants Lucy’s 
misgivings. This power imbalance in the film is compounded by the contrast between Lucy’s 
concern that she is infringing on Henry’s self-determination and preventing him from embarking 
on his trip to Alaska and the apparent lack of concern for Lucy’s self-determination throughout 
the film. The limitation of Lucy’s self-determination by virtue of her restricted access to 
authorship is illustrated perhaps most obviously in the film’s final moments aboard Henry’s 
Alaskan research vessel. 
 
ALASKA: THE LAST FRONTIER 
The representation of memory as contested ground in 50 First Dates, vulnerable to the claims 
of multiple authors, is essentially very much in line with more overtly politicized 
characterizations of technologically mediated memory in films such as The Bourne Identity, 
Total Recall, and Paycheck. That being said, where these films position government, military, 
and/or corporate actors with stakes in the amnesiac’s memory, 50 First Dates substitutes a 
patriarchal family structure. The film seems to propose a model for the management – or, as I 
argue, the authorship – of Lucy’s memory that is the stuff of faerie tales. Lucy’s situation hardly 
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changes from the beginning of the film to the end; she remains at the mercy of an isolating 
paternalistic family structure closely resembling the one from which Henry endeavoured to 
liberate her in the first place. Here Halberstam is correct to point out how it becomes clear that, 
“the heterosexual conceit of all romantic comedies is revealed here as the misguided belief that 
in passing from father to husband the woman starts life anew.”58 Indeed, despite Lucy’s ‘fresh 
start’ with Henry in Alaska, her subjugation (which the film appears to justify through her 
amnesia) remains relatively static from the family home to her married life at sea. In the 
beginning, she is isolated, imprisoned by the routine of a single day, relying on the fictions of her 
father and brother to construct her perception of the ‘real world.’ At the film’s conclusion, 
Lucy’s isolation is in fact more extreme. The key difference between these two lifeworlds is that 
Henry’s romantic and sexual relationship with Lucy is nearly impossible in the former, and 
virtually the only option in the latter. As Halberstam points out, 50 First Dates flirts with the 
motif of brainwashing without acknowledging it as such.59 Perhaps oddly, the height of Lucy’s 
agency actually coincides with her institutionalization during her separation from Henry. It was 
in fact Lucy herself who insisted on moving into the psychiatric institute and, according to 
Marlin, she is actually thriving there. Ostensibly made aware of her condition each day, Lucy 
teaches an art class to the other patients who also live at the psychiatric institute. We even see 
her leading a tour through the marine park where Henry works – though of course she regards 
him, albeit somewhat flirtatiously, as a complete stranger. Perhaps most significantly, at the 
institute, Lucy is no longer burdened by an injunction to love someone she does not recognize. 
Indeed, as Halberstam argues, “when Lucy forgets Henry, she forgets patriarchy, heterosexuality, 
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[and] gender hierarchies.”60 Halberstam goes on to conclude that, unconsciously, 50 First Dates 
accommodates a reading of forgetting as a kind of technology of resistance. Thus we can read 
the struggles of other authors in/of Lucy’s life to substitute her lost memories also as attempts to 
suppress her resistance. 
Here we may productively compare 50 First Dates to an earlier film that similarly regards 
amnesia rather opportunistically, Garry Marshall’s Overboard (1987). Dean (Kurt Russell), a 
carpenter and single father of four boys claims as his ‘wife’ Joanna (Goldie Hawn), a wealthy 
former client who has fallen overboard her yacht and lost all memory of who she is. In a perhaps 
strangely extravagant and prolonged act of revenge, Dean manages to convince Joanna, 
rennamed ‘Annie,’ that she is his wife and mother of his children. The tale of unlikely love that 
follows is imbricated with a re-education of sorts in which Joanna/Annie eventually accepts her 
role as wife and mother, leaving her materialistic and decidedly non-maternal life of luxury 
behind her. While, as Halberstam argued, Lucy’s amnesia provides an opportunity to also forget 
the demands of patriarchy, Overboard regards Joanna/Annie’s amnesia as an opportunity to 
remember the same. In the case of 50 First Dates, the film understands Henry’s refusal to fall 
properly in monogamous love and start a family as an obstacle to overcome. When Lucy is at her 
most agentic, living at the institute and teaching her art class, she is effectively preventing Henry 
from fully realizing his patriarchal role. Indeed, the exceptionality of Lucy’s institutionalization 
and the agency it affords her is especially apparent when contrasted with her final situation in 
Alaska. In Overboard, of course, it is Joanna/Annie’s refusal to mature into motherhood that 
poses the problem. Significantly, in both films, the male protagonist’s authorship of the amnesiac 
woman’s past/identity is presented as a corrective, and perhaps even a healing, measure against 
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the erosion of ‘traditional family values’ in modern life.61 Here the female body becomes a 
vehicle for a kind of redemptive rebirth and the realization of the male protagonist’s revisionist 
history. Put differently, the amnesiac female body is cast as a text that lacks resistance to ‘other’ 
authors. Such an analysis of gender dynamics in these two amnesia films helps to adumbrate the 
ways in which the bifurcated model of memory is perhaps always already gendered. Referring 
back to my analysis of the reunion of the romantic couple in Lucy’s art studio in Chapter I, we 
are reminded how Lucy’s act of authorship, so to speak, is actually the artistic realization of her 
subconscious embodied memory and not a conscious or technical ‘writing’ of a narrative. 
Subconscious embodied memory is thus conflated with the female body whereas technologically 
mediated memory is aligned with the patriarchal authorial subject. In other words, the body of 
subconscious embodied memory is that of a woman.  
In Alaska, Lucy’s memory is almost hermetically sealed. Indeed, Lucy is now more or less 
stranded on an arctic expedition with her father, husband, and, perhaps most surprisingly, her 
young daughter whom she must meet for the first time every day. The rather horrifying notion 
that Lucy endured some version of this each morning of her pregnancy aside, the scarcity of 
other people on the expedition means, in effect, there are very few alternative authorial voices 
for Lucy. In fact, as far as we see, Lucy’s voice still has not made it into her morning memory 
video – Henry appears to still be the primary author. The video is really all that Lucy has that 
could contradict the narrative disseminated to her from Henry and her father, though it is likely 
safe to assume that the video would align with such a narrative. Also gone are the other media, 
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newspapers for instance, that could disrupt the familial lifeworld maintained on the Alaskan 
vessel. Waking in the cabin of Henry’s boat, Lucy watches the latest version of her memory 
videotape, through which both Lucy and the viewer discover simultaneously what has occurred 
since her reunion with Henry in the art studio; most significantly, Henry and Lucy have married. 
Upon the video’s completion, Lucy draws back the curtain covering the porthole to reveal the 
ocean scene outside. Here we see a reversal of the film’s earlier introductory scene in which the 
camera plunges into the dolphin tank and through the glass window of Henry’s office. This time, 
the camera pulls away from Lucy’s rapt face backwards through the porthole, sweeping upwards 
to expose the striking image of the boat surrounded by glaciers and icy ocean water. In these 
visual terms, Lucy is rendered in something of a fishbowl herself, plagued by a memory 
condition not entirely unlike that of a goldfish. As discussed above, the refulgent whiteness of 
Alaska delivers the final literalization of the ‘blank slate,’ and the colonialist impulses evident in 
the Hawaiian setting are taken to their extreme. Henry is now the head of a pioneering family, 
adventuring bravely into the Arctic Circle in the noble pursuit of scientific knowledge. Of 
course, one of the ironies of this final scene is that the supposedly breathtaking natural beauty, 
signifying a kind of pure potentiality, is quite clearly a computer-generated image. Once again, 
the naturalized blankness of Alaska, like Hawaii and the terrain of Lucy’s memory, reveals itself 
to be a kind of technologically mediated fiction. It seems that, perhaps accidentally, 50 First 
Dates reasserts the potential for manipulation and thus a certain untrustworthiness of digital 
technology. Overall, the anthropomorphization of the dyadic model of memory discussed above 
animates a particular nightmare of the digital age. That is, the fear that the erosion of ‘human’ 
memory in the digital age, represented in its extreme by the amnesiac subject in virtually all the 




THE S/TEXTUAL AUTHORIAL BODY 
As emphasized above, Lucy is allowed similarly little self-determination in both her initial 
situation, living with her father and brother who work to protect her from the truth of her 
amnesia, and her life with Henry in which she is still encouraged to, or perhaps coerced into, 
accepting someone else’s narrativization of her life. The central problem here is that Lucy is 
alienated from a mode of memory authorship for herself. If we accept that memory is a crucial 
force in the formation of subjectivity, it follows that the formation of Lucy’s subjectivity, 
through Henry’s video in lieu of her memory, is inevitably a subjectivity formed on Henry’s 
terms. Kaja Silverman’s intervention into Barthes’ writing on the author speaks to this 
problematic. Silverman makes the compelling argument that despite declaring famously that the 
author is dead,62 Barthes reconstitutes the “authorial body” – five years after “the Death of the 
Author,” in The Pleasure of the Text – “not as biographical or corporeal profile but as the 
materiality of writing. The body of the author has become the (highly eroticized) body of the 
text.”63 This anthropomorphization of the text Silverman identifies, if we read the content of 
memory as a text, bears striking parallels to the dyadic model of subconscious embodied 
memory and technologically mediated memory put forth by this thesis. This is to say the 
destruction, or ‘deprivileging,’64 of the author and the author’s reconstitution in the body of the 
text essentially describes a process of technological mediation. What is significant about this 
event, so to speak, is that just as the status of the author comes undone in the act of 
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mediatization, it is returned to an embodied form. Put differently, just as embodied memory 
imagines a profoundly powerful ‘pure’ memory, the death of the author constitutes a kind of pure 
authorship – one that belongs not to an individual, but to the technological or material 
mediatization of the text itself. We can productively understand 50 First Dates to be responding, 
albeit unconsciously, to this dissolution of the paternalistic author. If the new figure of the author 
asserts itself through embodiment in the text, then the film certainly works to ensure that Lucy’s 
embodiment in the narrative of her memory is in fact authored by Henry; there is this effort to 
reassert the paternalistic author as the subject who is actually ‘writing.’ We can find a 
literalization of such a reassertion in Christopher Nolan’s Memento (2000), in which the 
amnesiac protagonist, Leonard (Guy Pearce), covers his body with tattoos that function as 
instructions to help him navigate and solve the mystery of who might be after him and why. 
Leonard’s tattoos constitute a bodily text that bears witness to his authorial subjectivity – the 
author and the text are quite literally embodied as one and the same. Here we can see how the 
authorial body is not only textual in a strictly material sense, apropos of Barthes, but it is also 
sexual and therefore imbricated with the power dynamics that follow from its genderization.  
While the power dynamic of sorts that follows from Silverman’s Barthesian model of 
embodied authorship may appear to articulate the primacy of technology in a technological age 
insofar as the text becomes dominant, I argue that in actuality it works to settle the score between 
the human and the technological. The status of the authorial body is, in a sense, no longer 
threatened by the encroachment of technological anonymity – rather, the authorial body is 
affirmed by and through the text. Indeed, as Silverman reminds us, “the author’s body remains as 
the support for and agent of écriture.”65 The material existence of the text is thus evidence that 
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an authorial subjectivity has in fact been constituted. Significantly, Silverman recognizes that 
Barthes’ efforts to dispossess the author of his position is coded in highly gendered terms – to be 
specific, the author is meant to be stripped of his “paternal legacy.”66 What is interesting about 
this gendered decomposition of the author is that it describes a model of female authorship that is 
perhaps always already embodied and grounded in a certain textual materiality. It is perhaps 
unsurprising that there is a corresponding effort to reclaim the ground apparently lost by the 
paternalistic author when one considers Elsaesser’s description of the gendering of digital age 
technology more generally. As Elsaesser notes, “women have been crucial in ‘naturalizing’ a 
new media technology as well as problematizing its effects on gender relations.”67 Elsaesser’s 
phrasing on the link between recent media technologies and notions of the feminine is worth 
recalling at length: 
“In the emphasis on such traditional attributes of the female mind as ‘parallel processing’, 
‘distributed attention’ or ‘collaborative intelligence’, the digital media may find 
themselves naturalized by virtue of being ‘feminized’: perhaps in order to keep at bay – 
and to control – another form of the undeadness of data, the ‘too much’ of stimuli that 
threatens the very possibility of perception and comprehension, and thus the very 
manageability of processing.”68  
Elsaesser’s account makes clear the gender dynamics underlying contemporary anxieties around 
the overwhelming of the human in a technological age. This is to say that the looming dangers of 
ubiquitous computing in a technological age is coded in gendered terms. Following from 
Elsaesser, the threat of the digital age becomes not only de-humanization, but emasculation. 
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The model of subconscious embodied memory in 50 First Dates also leaves intact the 
imagination of a kind of original state of nature, an initial subjectivity that is articulated 
seamlessly with the ‘natural’ body. Insofar as Lucy’s amnesia renders her a kind of original 
‘blank slate,’ she comes to stand in for a kind of primaeval woman, a figure of pure narrative 
potentiality. It is in this sense that Lucy’s function in the narrative of 50 First Dates parallels the 
function of another ‘Lucy’ from the field of paleoanthropology. In Lori D. Hager’s edited 
collection on the representation of women in discourses around human evolution, she works 
through the gendered implications of Donald Johanson’s 1974 discovery of “Lucy,” one of the 
earliest known hominids at the time, in Hadar, Ethiopia.69 Significantly, the discovery of our 
early bipedal ancestor challenged many assumptions about human evolution, perhaps most 
significantly when and where we began to walk upright, and remains a source of debate in the 
paleoanthropological community.70 Since the overarching goal of studying early hominids is “the 
very nature of what it is to be a modern human,”71 as Hager asserts, “knowing whether [‘Lucy’] 
was a female or not is ultimately of great consequence to understanding ourselves”72 
Importantly, Hager identifies a tendency within paleoanthropology to understand early female 
hominids according to the conceptions of gender that circumscribe the researcher’s 
sociohistorical moment.73 The implication here is that even scientific understandings of ourselves 
as humans are inflected by the ideological inclinations particular to the sociohistorical moment 
of discovery and not origin. Johanson’s best-selling written account of his find integrates his 
discovery of Lucy, and thus the writing of the history of humankind, within a detailed personal 
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narrative. The lively book often reads somewhat like an adventurer’s memoir; indeed, a New 
York Times reviewer points out “certain lapses of humility” in Johanson’s description of 
events;74 Johanson’s vibrant persona and his memory of events become sutured to the story of 
Lucy’s discovery. This is to say that once again we find a demonstration of authorial 
embodiment constituted in and through the text – Johanson and the ideological underpinnings of 
his historical moment are inscribed onto Lucy’s textual body. In both cases, Lucy functions as 
something of a historical vessel, a ‘blank slate’ onto which paternalistic authors may (re)write 
their past in service of a future that maintains the status quo. Such a scenario indicates how a 
conceptualization of an embodied authorial subject, or ‘figure’ in Barthes’ terms, holds 
significant implications for the text. That is, by considering Johanson’s “Lucy” alongside the 
Lucy of 50 First Dates, we can begin to complicate the notion of embodied authorship by 
acknowledging the relative fiction of the blank slate in the first place.  
In Hélène Cixous’ seminal essay, “The Laugh of Medusa,” she draws attention to the extent 
to which women are alienated from the act of writing, of writing themselves into the world, an 
act reserved for the “great men” of history.75 She discusses the fear conjured by “female-sexed 
texts”76 because, in the simplest of terms, these texts threaten the primacy of the male author and 
challenge the invisibilization of women under such circumstances. Writing in 1976, Cixous 
asserts, “writing has been run by a libidinal and cultural – hence political, typically masculine – 
economy.”77 In a (wo)manifesto of sorts, Cixous interestingly maintains an indelible connection 
between a woman’s writing of her self and the writing of her body. For Cixous, though she 
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insists elsewhere that a “feminine practice of writing” is impossible to define,78 women’s writing 
perhaps always already necessitates the creation of a textually embodied authorial subject. 
Indeed, Cixous seems to recognize this emergence of an authorial subjectivity in and through the 
body of the text when she exclaims, “Write! and your self-seeking text will know itself better 
than flesh and blood.79 Here embodied authorship acquires and exceeds the self-assuring 
credibility of embodiment. Perhaps most importantly for this project, Cixous insists compellingly 
that “writing is precisely the very possibility of change, the space that can serve as a springboard 
for subversive thought, the precursory movement of a transformation of social and cultural 
structures.”80 It is here that Cixous articulates clearly the political stakes and radical potentiality 
of women who write. This is to say that a woman ‘writing her self,’ to borrow Cixous’ phrasing, 
inhabits a moment of liberation that is also the emergence of a textually embodied female author. 
Perhaps then it is unsurprising that the notion of Lucy’s authorship presents such a stubborn 
problematic for the narrative goals of 50 First Dates.  
Indeed, Lucy’s subconscious embodied memory represents a kind of author of last resort. 
Lucy is apparently unable to participate in the technological mediation of her memory; in fact, 
the disenfranchisement of her authorial voice intensifies as the technologies utilized move further 
towards the digital end of the spectrum. For example, Lucy becomes less directly involved with 
the digitization of her diary and the production of the video. Lucy’s mysterious ability to recall 
Henry’s image through her artwork despite having erased him from her technologically mediated 
memory attests to this power of the subconscious (female) embodied memory. In this sense 
Lucy’s subconscious embodied memory functions as a key site of resistance to the paternalistic 
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authorship of her life – it is perhaps the last remaining register of her memory that does not 
accommodate technological intervention. Of course, Lucy’s subconscious embodied memory 
also performs a function for Henry. Similar to Alaska, Lucy’s subconscious embodied memory 
provides a redemptive site of purity – Lucy becomes the pure, amenable, and importantly analog 
vehicle through which the male author’s mediation can be renewed without the technological 
hell of the modern U.S. Ultimately, the author as an embodied textual figure disrupts the 
temporality of a paternalistic model of authorship that insists on a pre-existing authorial subject, 
fully constituted before and without the text. The scenario that emerges from such an 
imagination of the authorial body reiterates the centrality of materiality – that is, the writing of 
memory – to the formation of a subject with a voice. Textually embodied authorship thus 
becomes a crucial part of self-determination. It perhaps unsurprising that this model of embodied 
authorship emerges in such a literal form when, as Pettman observes, “we see an emerging 
renegotiation of embodied identity in a unprecedented technophilic and –phobic age”81 We are 
left to ask the question, what are the implications of this injunction to write oneself, so to speak, 
in(to) the digital age?  
 
THE SLEEPING BODY 
Similar to other amnesia films like Memento, Clean Slate, Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless 
Mind, and, of course, Before I Go to Sleep, sleep plays a critical role in the functioning of 
memory in 50 First Dates. The representation of sleep as such a powerful force in these films 
ultimately corresponds with their common insistence on the primacy of the body, due principally 
to the construction of the body’s privileged and unassailable connection to subconscious 
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embodied memory. The following discussion will focus on sleep as the site of two key and 
seemingly paradoxical processes – both erasure and remembrance – in 50 First Dates and its 
other ‘amnesia film’ companions. First, while the aforementioned films adopt variably fantastical 
and more scientific approaches to memory, in each case sleep constitutes the site of erasure – it is 
the sleeping body that forgets or else is made to forget via technological means. In Eternal 
Sunshine, even though the rather surreal pseudo-medical memory erasure procedure is an 
elective service, the vulnerability of the sleeping body is regarded opportunistically; drug-
aided/enhanced sleep is the optimal state of being for the technicians of Lacuna Inc. to do their 
work. By capitalizing on the biological necessity of sleep, Lacuna seems to overcome what 
would otherwise be sleep’s resistance to the capitalist logic of 24/7 activity. Or, to put it in 
Crary’s terms, “sleep is an uncompromising interruption of the theft of time from us by 
capitalism.”82 In simple and cynical terms, we cannot consume in our sleep. Of course, any 
understanding of sleep includes the knowledge that on some level the sleeping brain is always an 
amnesiac brain; as the sleeping brain consolidates the day, the most 
important/meaningful/traumatic memories are inscribed on what we would call our long term 
memory while what the brain deems less important is sloughed off into the ether of our 
unconscious. It follows that sleep is essential to our ability to consolidate information, 
experience new memories, and so forth so that we may move onwards with our lives making use 
of the past in service of the future. The representation of sleep in Eternal Sunshine is largely 
compatible with that of 50 First Dates; sleep is in fact the relentless instrument of memory loss 
after Lucy’s accident. As we are reminded several times throughout the film (as though we may 
forget ourselves), it is as if Lucy’s “slate is wiped clean” every night as she sleeps. Lucy’s 
                                                
82 Crary, 10. 
 65 
quality of life is quite obviously limited by her memory condition and whatever progress Henry 
seems to have made in their courtship each day is undone overnight. The implication is that if 
only Lucy could find a way to avoid sleeping, perhaps she could remember Henry into the next 
day. Yet, as Crary reminds us, sleep is thus far an immovable force. This is made clear the night 
Henry and Lucy have sex for the first time; the couple tries desperately to stay awake, knowing 
too well that Lucy will not remember a thing the next morning. Indeed, when Lucy awakes the 
next morning to find a man she does not recognize in her bed it is hardly surprising that she 
attacks him with a lacrosse stick. Regardless of how superficially successful Henry’s video 
and/or Lucy’s diaries may be in standing in for Lucy’s lost memory during the day, the world of 
technology is shown to be outmatched by the biological necessity of sleep. We can begin to see 
here how sleep as a site of erasure deadens what is understood to be the technological 
encroachment onto the territory of sleep. Such a conceptualization gives way to larger questions 
about the extent to which a kind of essential identity, as represented in subconscious embodied 
memory, is also under threat in a technological age. 
Since sleep is where dreaming happens, it is also often a site of remembrance – subconscious 
embodied memory manifests itself in and through the amnesiac subjects’ dreamscape. As 
discussed in the first chapter’s analysis of Lucy’s miraculous remembrance of Henry while living 
at the psychiatric institute, Lucy’s dreams appeared to be able to reach the depths of her 
subconscious embodied memory. Once Henry’s image – and as I argued a certain ‘essence’ of 
Lucy’s love for him – populated the landscape of her dreams, Lucy was subsequently able to 
give the images of her subconscious memory material form. Sleep, or more precisely dreaming, 
comes to temporarily bridge the gap between subconscious embodied memory and 
technologically mediated memory. In so doing sleep reiterates the ‘natural’ human body as a site 
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of technological resistance and also, apropos of Crary, a site of resistance to the 24/7 consumer 
capitalist demands of life in the digital age more generally. In dreaming, the body becomes a 
unique and ultimately analog technology that is able to access the terrain of subconscious 
embodied memory. Moreover, forgoing something like inception, the dreamer constitutes a 
singular authorial subject, unburdened and unrestricted by the interests of other authors. 
 
THE ETHICAL OTHER 
Ula’s five young children, almost always recording the action on a handheld video 
camera, occupy the background of several scenes over the course of the film – apparently, Ula is 
making an amateur documentary about his life. It is actually the same video camera that Henry 
borrows in order to produce Lucy’s video. Ula’s children’s seemingly innocuous presence in the 
wings of so many scenes performs a symbolic function of what I will call the figure of the 
‘ethical other’; here we can identify a parallel in contemporary discourses around privacy in the 
Internet age. Ula’s children recall the way in which the ethical other – who is always already 
‘watching’ in the digital age – could be almost anyone. The unsettling and uncertain potential of 
such ‘watchers’ has been acknowledged as a dimension of participatory cultures on the Internet 
from the early days of chat rooms and discussion boards. As Henry Jenkins notes, early 
discussion groups around David Lynch’s cult television series Twin Peaks (1990-91) referred to 
such non-participating observers as “lurkers,”83 gesturing to both an elusive pseudo-presence and 
perhaps a kind of latent danger of the unknowable other(s) online. Today, it is common 
knowledge that virtually everything we do on our computers and ‘smart’ devices is archived and 
available to ‘Big Brother.’ As Orit Halpern reminds us, though she works to denaturalize this 
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notion, “we have come to assume that the world is always already fully recorded and archived; 
accessible at a moment’s notice through the logics of computational searches.”84 This may lead 
us to ask, what does it mean to construct a personal archive with the assumption that it will be 
made eventually – or perhaps even immediately – open to publics and authorial voices that 
cannot be controlled by the ‘original’ author? One result is a kind of anxious compulsion to 
clarify ‘for the record’ one’s intentions or true feelings, lest the eventual viewer/reader 
misinterpret the ‘memory.’ Thus the constitution of the authorial subject is inflected by a kind of 
self-censorship. Cognizant of what is presumed to be our inevitable failure to act as effective 
gatekeepers of our ‘data’ in the age of the Internet, we write largely for an anonymous future 
reader(s). Thus technologically mediated memory becomes a form of memory that is always 
already co-authored by an (albeit imagined) other. It is perhaps easy then to understand the 
appeal of a model of subconscious embodied memory that is resistant to technological 
intervention when the alternative appears to offer such a compromised position of authorial 
subjectivity. Pettman, apropos of Silverman’s work on visual attraction, maintains that in such a 
scenario in which the self does not precede the encounter with the other, “The ‘ontological force’ 
[…] prompts an ethical assessment of one’s own actions, not so much in the moralistic-
behavioural sense (“Am I a good person?”) but according to a more symbolic economy of 
recognition and deferral (“Am I a person?”).”85 Pettman’s parsing of the ontological force of the 
encounter with the other helps to illustrate the stakes of my analysis of the figure of the ethical 
other in 50 First Dates – that is, in the wake of something of a crisis of authorial subjectivity, the 
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ethical other appears as a manifestation of cultural concerns around the participatory turn in 
digital era memory processes.  
Before conducting an analysis of Ula’s children as emblematic of the figure of the ethical 
other in relation to memory authorship, it is necessary to develop fully the technological and 
ideological context from which this figure emerges. Indeed, while Silverman’s parsing of 
Barthes provides a useful theorization of female authorship, it is prudent to look to how other 
scholars have configured authorship specifically with regards to the age of digital technology. 
Taina Bucher identifies the seemingly paradoxical dual function of the Internet in relation to 
something like the formation of authorial subjectivity: 
“The regime of visibility associated with Web 2.0 connects to the notion of 
empowerment, as it has greatly expanded the social field of becoming recognized as a 
subject with a voice. On the other hand, ubiquitous computing with increased deployment 
of surveillance technologies has often been associated with a sense of 
disempowerment.”86  
In a situation such as the one Bucher describes, it becomes apparent that a certain degree of 
technological memory mediation is demanded by modes of subject-formation in the age of the 
Internet. Bucher argues in relation to more recent social media phenomena, namely Facebook, 
that we are no longer governed by the kind of “threat of visibility” Foucault elucidates from the 
architecture of the Panopticon, but rather by a “threat of invisibility.”87 Indeed, Foucault’s 
characterization of the panopticon prisoner always as a seen object, never a seeing subject, 88 
resists transposition onto life in the age of the Internet. Today, social media platforms such as 
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Facebook facilitate both the generation and consumption of content; such ‘sharing’ complicates 
previously more stable models of surveillance. Van Dijck notes how our use of Facebook is 
structured around an imperative of ‘sharing’ instead of privacy, which is propped up, or perhaps 
better ‘re-branded,’ in opposition to the contemporary values of openness and transparency.89 
Though it may be tempting to read Internet 2.0 as a kind of dispersed and malevolent form of 
corporate and/or government surveillance on a grand scale, it is important to recognize our 
willful participation in such a structure. In many ways we have co-opted our own surveillance, 
becoming clusters of readable and, importantly, intimate data. Social media platforms now 
mediate our wider social, professional, and sexual domains of life – we make look to Facebook, 
LinkedIn, Academia.edu, eHarmony.com, and also ‘hookup’ apps like Tinder for examples of 
the apparent necessity of ‘personal profiles’ to multiple dimensions of contemporary life, to say 
nothing of the often confessional utterances that constitute our ‘status updates.’ It becomes clear 
that we cannot fully become authorial subjects, or ‘subjects with a voice’ in Bucher’s terms, until 
we ‘visualize,’ or perhaps ‘share,’ our memories. Put differently, the technological mediation of 
our memories is demanded as a crucial component of subject formation in the digital age. This 
recalls Silverman’s account of the status of the authorial body after Barthes in the sense that the 
act of writing constitutes the precondition, not the result, of subject-formation. Ultimately, if 
Lucy is the subject whose formation is paramount in 50 First Dates, and Henry is the primary 
author, then Ula’s children come to represent the elusive third party, the ethical other of the 
digital imaginary. 
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Fig. 1 
Ula’s children’s video camera enters the diegesis early on; immediately after the film’s 
introductory sequence chronicling Henry’s series of flings, we are taken to the marine park 
where a large crowd is applauding the dolphin show. The camera plunges into the water 
alongside a dolphin to find the porthole that separates Henry’s office from the pool. We glimpse 
a group of small children with a video camera pointed at the tank. It is from here that the camera 
appears to move through the glass and into Henry’s office where he is stitching a shark bite his 
eccentric friend Ula has sustained. Ula’s children are recording the spectacle, though this could 
easily go unobserved. What is curious about this scene is that our attention is drawn to the video 
camera’s presence only after it occurs to Ula that a joke about sharks may be the perfect title for 
his “documentary.” If previously we might have disregarded the video camera as simply a prop 
for the children to play with in the background of the scene, now the camera and its 
‘documentary’ function is foregrounded. Indeed, in this scene amateur ‘documentary’ is always 
already lurking in the background, awaiting its call to use. As Ula turns to his children to repeat 
his nonsensical line into the lens of the video camera, there is a cut to a lower-grade digital 
image marked by the red dot and “REC” stamp in the bottom left corner (fig. 1). The implication 
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here is that we are viewing the footage captured by the children on the video camera. Both Ula 
and Henry address the video camera with silly one-liners before we are released from the 
“documentary” within the film; this shift back to the ‘real world’ of the film is punctuated by 
another shot of the children recording the moment on video. The rest of the scene cuts back and 
forth between the amateur video footage and the more polished look of the film itself. Of course, 
the majority of the film is certainly rather farcical, but it is worth noting how Ula and Henry’s 
decidedly inane one-liners are reserved for the video camera. What is important to observe in this 
scene is how the video camera’s presence, standing in for a kind of digital other, embeds a 
certain performativity into Ula and Henry’s behaviour. To articulate the significance of this for 
an understanding of memory (co)authorship in the digital age, we can look to Philip Agre’s 
notion of ‘capture’ as a model of privacy. Agre explains how we internalize knowledge of the 
workings of devices of capture (eg. video cameras, analog film cameras, microphones, etc.). This 
has the effect of, “reordering behaviour so that it is more amenable to capture models (which 
were likely developed under the fiction that they transparently represented the prior state of 
behaviour).”90 To cite a banal explanatory example of the effect of capture that often appears on 
digital video sharing platforms such as YouTube,91 we can think of the uncanny video recordings 
of people who are under the false impression that they are posing for a still photo – they tend to 
pull faces and attempt to suspend their bodily movement as though the camera were capturing a 
more spontaneous single moment in chaotic time. In such a scenario, subjects behave for the 
benefit of the (assumed) technology of capture. However, video footage of such miscalculations 
                                                
90 Agre, 737. 
91 See “Super Awkward Montage of People Thinking They Are Posing For Pictures,” available 
at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Cgw5TVoh-qU, which illustrates the emphasis on 
affective discomfort, or ‘awkwardness,’ that ensues upon fissures of ‘capture.’   
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often exposes the uncomfortable disjuncture that ensues, the discomfort of which arguably stems 
from revealing the charade of spontaneity in this case. In their ubiquitous presence, always 
already recording the scene at hand on the video camera, I propose that Ula’s children are 
conflated with a decidedly digital technology of ‘capture’ (i.e., the video camera) and the 
understandings of credibility therein. Their presence, insofar as they are aligned with the 
function of the video camera, shapes the behavior of the subjects on camera. Furthermore, we 
can draw parallels here between the function of the ethical other and certain conceptions of 
confessionality in the digital age. In Michael Renov’s analysis of the centrality of confessionality 
to video cultures in the early days of the Internet, he recalls Foucault’s definition of the 
confession as a kind of ritual in which the ‘listener’ maintains a powerful ethical position over 
the confessor.92 While Renov insists that he does not intend to “make claims for something like a 
confessional potentiality intrinsic to the electronic medium,” he does admit to arguing, in 1996, 
for “a uniquely charged linkage between ‘video’ and ‘confession’ in the current cultural 
environment.”93 This ‘charged linkage’ helps to corroborate the notion that Ula’s children 
acquire an ethical function largely by virtue of their alignment with digital technologies of 
capture. That is, in addition to the relatively innocent morality aligned with their youth, by 
literalizing the ‘lurking’ publics of the Internet age, Ula’s children become a kind of ethical mass 
– their presence in concordance with the video camera effectively reorders the behaviours at 
hand on behalf of the technology of capture, the home video camera in this case.  
Of course, Ula’s children are more than just a soundboard for some of the perhaps weaker 
jokes in the dialogue of the scene. When the children (who are still recording their interactions) 
                                                
92 Renov, 79. 
93 Ibid. 
 73 
ask what a “nympho” means, Ula once again addresses the camera and fibs that the “nympho” is 
the state bird of Ohio. Throughout this scene the video camera functions not only to document 
the rather inconsequential conversation between Henry and Ula, but also to offer a corrective to 
some of the more unsavoury moments. For example, when Ula makes an offhand and 
disparaging remark about his wife there is a cut away to Ula’s children who are still recording 
their father. Acting as a kind of minor Greek chorus, the four younger children stand frowning 
with their arms folded while the eldest boy observes the event through the display screen 
attached to the video camera; each child is visibly upset. It is difficult to say whether it is the 
presence of his children or the video camera that causes Ula to back-peddle and insist that he was 
“just kidding.” At any rate, the result is a perhaps accidental collusion between the assumed 
innocence of the children and the video camera, which never forgets. This innocent ‘perfect’ 
memory offers something of a counter to the film’s engagement with amnesia – here the threat is 
posed more by remembering than forgetting. Of course, my comparison of Ula’s children to the 
chorus of Grecian drama is a loaded one, meant to emphasize how the figure of the ethical other, 
insofar as it is associated if not conflated with devices of capture (ie. the video camera), acquires 
a quality of objectivity by virtue of this association with ‘photographic’ technologies. It is this 
accepted objectivity of the anonymous other in the digital age that encourages us to regard the 
figure of the ethical other as such.  
 
THE THEMATIZATION OF OBSERVATION 
The film’s opening scene in Henry’s ‘underwater’ office introduces an element of lurking 
observation that pervades the film from this point onwards. Indeed, characters are frequently 
being observed without their knowledge or permission, much like the dolphins in the tank. The 
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glow from the water tank imbues Henry’s office with the bluish hue we perhaps most closely 
associate with a television or computer screen (Fig. 2). There are gags throughout the film in 
which dolphins (and sometimes Ula) in the tank look in on Henry in his office. Frequently, 
unwelcome observation occurs in moments when presumably the characters would most like 
privacy. For example, when Henry and Lucy are about to have sex for the first time after a 
romantic date at the marine park, two dolphins appear to be looking in through the window 
dividing Henry’s office from the tank – Henry has to shoo them away. After that, Henry looks up 
from the sofa in his office to discover Ula watching enthusiastically and miming suggestions 
from inside the tank. Henry’s office performs multiple functions throughout the film; it is 
Henry’s place of work, though he also appears to sleep there, as well as a love nest, and a 
hangout complete with beer kept cool in a refrigerator meant to house biological samples. While 
in practical terms Henry’s multipurpose office is convenient, it also literalizes the blurring of 
public and private spaces that characterizes the age of the Internet. Here the window functions as 
a kind of two-way screen by which Henry is simultaneously observing and observed. Indeed, the 
window is hardly a neutrally transparent pane of glass, but rather a screen that mediates and 
distorts vision on either side. Thus Henry’s office becomes a kind of elsewhere akin to a virtual 
space. Its ‘underwater’ location is amenable to such a reading; visually, the space is reminiscent 
of depictions of virtual spaces, or perhaps more precisely cyberspace, common to the genre of 
science fiction. My intention is not to propose a symbolic reading of this aspect of 50 First 
Dates, but rather to suggest that the depiction of such spaces – that is, spaces that facilitate 
observation and surveillance simultaneously – borrows from a visual repertoire circumscribed by 
digital technologies. This is to say that the observation of the private from within public space, 
and vice versa, becomes wed to the visuality of screen technologies, the interfaces that enable 
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both observation and surveillance. It is also important to note how such a notion of the interface 
complicates more straightforward understandings of private and public. Indeed, the shared screen 
between the aquarium and Henry’s office constitutes a liminal zone of observation that is alien 
both to public and private space. There are obvious parallels to the virtual here insofar as 
subjects on either side of the screen are simultaneously observing and observed; in other words, 
to use the screen for surveillance is also to be surveilled. The dual function of the screen is 
reiterated when, as mentioned above, Ula dives into the dolphin tank in order to observe Henry 
and Lucy in the office. As it happens, Henry’s office bears a striking resemblance to the bunker 
built in 1999 by the dot-com entrepreneur Josh Harris, in which Harris staged a ‘social 
experiment’ of sorts that sought to accelerate and demonstrate the Orwellian futures of the 
Internet.94 Every corner of the bunker was surveilled by video cameras and each participant had a 
personal television monitor in their sleeping pods with which to ‘tune in’ to other participants’ 
monitors or any other surveillance footage from the bunker’s many cameras. As a result of the 
multitude of the ‘always on’ screens, the visual effect of this environment of ubiquitous 
surveillance and observation coated the bunker with a flickering bluish light similar to the 
observation floors of aquariums. Early imaginations of the perhaps darker potential futures of life 
in the age of the Internet, or “panoptic paranoia”95 to borrow Kilbourn’s turn of phrase, have 
clearly enjoyed a lasting aestheticization that is grounded (at least visually) in a contested zone 
of ubiquitous and mutual surveillance. Thus an always already semi-public life in the digital age, 
                                                
94 See Ondi Timoner’s 2009 documentary on Josh Harris, We Live in Public. As demonstrated in 
work by Nathan Jurgenson as well as Steve Mann and Joseph Ferenbok in the scholarly journal 
Surveillance & Society, Josh Harris is still popularly regarded as a rather prophetic and/or 
pioneering figure in the recent history of the Internet and social media as we have come to know 
it. 
95 Kilbourn, 136. 
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At the beginning of the film, Lucy also lives in a kind of captivity; she spends her daily 
life in the few ‘secure’ locations that can be monitored by her family and friends. From what we 
see, her activities are limited to the family home, the Huki Lau Café where Sue and Nick look 
after her, and the stretches of highway in between. Lucy and Henry’s courtship is, for the most 
part, intensely supervised. Their (many) first encounters at the Huki Lau Café are overseen by 
Sue and the meat-cleaver-wielding Nick, who repeatedly remind Henry that they are prepared to 
step in to protect Lucy’s interests. Later, Marlin and Doug make a point of being rather 
remarkably in the loop when it comes to Lucy’s interactions with Henry, resulting in his 
banishment from the café. All this merely functions to reiterate a basic conceit of the film – that 
everyone, especially Lucy, is constantly vulnerable to being observed by an unauthorized other 
who may intervene. By way of bookending the thematization of surveillance in 50 First Dates, it 
is worth noting that the final song that plays over the ending credits is in fact Ub40’s rendition of 
The Police’s “Every Breath You Take.” Once again, we see a literalization of the re-authoring 
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process that runs through the film’s narrative – despite Ub40’s ska twist on the popular song, it is 
virtually impossible to listen to “Every Breath You Take” without ‘hearing’ Sting and his iconic 
voice. As the following verse cascades over the rolling text, we are confronted with a kind of 
vaguely threatening love note that rather accurately characterizes Lucy’s ultimate predicament: 
Every single day 
And every word you say 
Every game you play, every night you stay 
I’ll be watching you 
Here 50 First Dates appears almost cheekily canny to its elision of Lucy’s agency throughout the 
film. Indeed, this less popular version of the song is a cover of the original that would have been 
performed by Sting, its ‘author,’ so to speak. Beyond reiterating the running theme of 
surveillance, this final song reflects, albeit allegorically, a central concern of the film – that is, 
the easy bleeding of authorship so often associated with the digital age. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Following from the analysis above, a key component of self-determination, or more 
precisely the articulation of an authorial subject, becomes one’s ability to demarcate a private 
domain of memory in an age circumscribed by what is now perhaps a cliché blurring of public 
and private. This presents obvious parallels to concerns over what Sassen refers to as “private 
digital space.”96 In the midst of a “colonizing of public digital space by private (i.e, corporate) 
actors,”97 the distinction between private and public space – and, further, what is meant by 
                                                
96 Sassen, 105. 
97 Ibid. 
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‘privacy’ – has become increasingly difficult to discern in the digital. 50 First Dates’ 
construction of subconscious embodied memory as a kind of analog alternative to 
technologically mediated memory, resistant to intervention, emerges largely in response to such 
concerns. Put differently, when the spaces we occupy either in cyberspace or ‘meatspace,’ to 
borrow from Manovich, cease to be either distinctly private or public, there appears to be a 
subsequent effort to reassert a kind of ultimate private space delineated by the body. Thus the 
human body becomes a kind of technological dead zone and, for 50 First Dates, an emblem of 
the romanticization of resistance to a kind of cyborgian future. Here memory itself becomes the 
most powerful entity while the body becomes a technology, acting as a gatekeeper for perhaps a 
quintessentially analog (by virtue of its connection to the body) register of memory. Such a 
scenario demands that a model of authorial subjectivity – one that is perhaps not yet co-authored 
by the figure of the ethical other – be constituted in subconscious embodied memory. More 
generally, this situation gestures to the cultural anxieties surrounding the threatened position of 
the human in the digital age. Of course, the impulse to reassert the primacy of the human in the 
face of technology has long been a feature of modernity. Halpern reminds us, apropos of Barthes, 
that, “the presentation of reality, a feature of nineteenth century literature, emerged […] at the 
moment when human experience was increasingly mediated – through new techniques of 
writing, reading, and recording.”98 To recall an illustrative example of Halpern’s observation, 
Elsaesser notes in his essay on Freud “as a media theorist:” 
“Freud was apparently more interested in the human body/psyche as (technical) medium 
than in technical media as such: in the face of the invasion of mass media he was, above 
all, a cultural conservative, as if his invention of psychoanalysis was aimed at preserving 
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the embodied and gendered nature of communication against its increasing 
disembodiment, mechanization, decontextualization and automation.”99 
While my analysis of 50 First Dates elucidates a similar project to Freud’s, as described by 
Elsaesser, it is important to account for the vicissitudes of this rather defensive move towards the 
human body in the digital age. This is to say that the disembodiment, automation, and other 
threats to the status of ‘natural’ human memory have undoubtedly intensified in a digital era and 
taken a form that Freud could not have predicted. We can find an example of this anxiety around 
how the technological mediation of our memories and thus our identities on the Internet renders 
our ‘private selves’ open to an ultimately unknowable ‘public’ in J Sage Elwell’s description of a 
“browsable” transmediated identity. 100 Elwell argues that such identities are produced in and 
formed by the liminal space between the real and the virtual in an era circumscribed by “constant 
connectivity and ubiquitous computing.”101 Here mediatized identity in the digital age becomes 
not only public as opposed to private and technologically as opposed to ‘naturally’ constituted, 
but also collective as opposed to individual – and this is clearly a cause for concern for the 
author. In an attempt to address the gap between what is understood as individual and collective 
memory in a modern technological age, Alison Landsberg theorizes a cinematic “prosthetic 
memory.” Landsberg’s model of prosthetic memory functions somewhat like an external hard 
drive, or, to mobilize her metaphor, like an artificial limb – an extension of the human that is 
decidedly unhuman, virtual, and technological. Perhaps most importantly for Landsberg, a 
prosthetic memory is also “produced by an experience of mass-mediated representations.”102 The 
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prosthetic becomes a part of the self that is constituted not simply through an encounter with an 
other, but a technologically mediated experience of a kind of second-hand memory that was 
always already produced ‘one-size-fits-all’ and yet simultaneously of another’s memories.103 To 
the extent that memories constitute crucial components of identity, the threat lurking in the 
shadows of this scenario seems to be the vanishing of individuality into the digital abyss. Indeed, 
as Kilbourn reminds us, “rather than an historical consciousness that might allow for individually 
and socially progressive political action, postmodern pop culture gives us ‘collective memory’ as 
often as not packaged in nostalgic terms.”104 Whether memory (and perhaps identity) in the 
digital age is ‘collective,’ ‘prosthetic,’ ‘transmediated,’ or otherwise, what becomes clear is that 
this persistent turn towards the human and analog in the digital age is essentially very much in 
line with modern sensibilities that value the articulation of individuality, personal uniqueness, 
and the singular (and gendered) figure of the author.  
                                                
103 Kilbourn emphasizes how Landsberg’s theorization of both nostalgia and prosthetic memory 
is essentially a case of “the subject appropriating ‘memories,’ a past, so to speak, that is not 
proper to it; someone else’s past; another’s memories” (124). 







The two chapters of this thesis have worked in tandem to articulate the broader stakes of 
my case study of 50 First Dates. By working through the intersecting functions of technology 
and memory within an intimate relationship in the film, I hope to have operationalized amnesia 
as a vector through which we can achieve a more comprehensive understanding of the status of 
‘human’ memory in the digital age. While ultimately I sought to demonstrate just some of the 
myriad ways in which a bifurcated understanding of memory haunts larger discussions around 
privacy and intimacy in the digital age, such a claim must stand on the shoulders of two key 
proofs. The first chapter, “The Eternal Sunshine of Lucy’s Mind” established the first of these 
proofs – namely, that this dyadic model of memory is cut along distinctly technological lines. 
This chapter worked to elucidate how objects along the analog/digital spectrum are regarded 
differently in terms of their suitability to act as memory aids and substitutes. It is through this 
consistent nostalgic privileging of the analog and distrust of the digital that a dyadic model of 
memory emerges, with subconscious embodied memory associated with the analog and 
technologically mediated memory aligned with the digital. By conducting textual analyses of 
important ‘technological moments’ in the film and demonstrating the extent to which analog 
technologies are privileged for their greater proximity to the human body, I hope to have brought 
my two-part model of memory into relief. Ultimately, this first chapter begins an examination of 
how such a conception of memory (or rather the opposition of two models of memory) both 
informs and is informed by discourses around human intimacy in the digital age. This 
examination is revisited and extended in perhaps more overtly political terms, particularly with 
regards to models of authorship, in Chapter II. 
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The second chapter, “My Private Alaska,” takes its cue from the first chapter’s 
theorization of subconscious embodied memory and technologically mediated memory in order 
to investigate the broader implications of the participatory turn in digital era memory processes. 
The second proof provided by this chapter asserts that such a fractured understanding of memory 
is symptomatic of the modern tendency to reassert and recommit to the ‘natural’ human body as 
a kind of sacred ground to be defended from the digital. Lucy’s memory condition, in which her 
working daily memory is more or less housed in external media such as Henry’s video, literalizes 
the perceived vulnerability of human memory in the digital age. If technological intervention in 
memory processes accommodates a situation in which our memories and thus crucial 
components of our identities may be authored (or at least co-authored) by others, as indeed the 
film suggests, then it is perhaps easy to understand the appeal of subconscious embodied 
memory – that is, a form of memory that is both resistant towards and inaccessible to 
technological mediation and the claims of other ‘authors.’ The attractiveness of subconscious 
embodied memory and thus a form of embodied authorship is compounded when we consider 
the imperative of writing oneself into the fabric of the digital, to echo Bucher’s notion of the 
threat of invisibility. This is to say that subconscious embodied memory preserves the possibility 
of a kind of ‘pure’ unmediated authorial subjectivity. My analysis of the function of authorship 
sought to articulate the ideological underpinnings of the film’s engagement with the act of 
writing memory (and thus producing a viable authorial subject) through technologies. The notion 
of (co)authoring in the digital age, in relation to an ethical other who is always already 
observing, gestures towards the extent to which the digital is perceived to threaten the individual. 
In the face of a technological domination perceived fearfully to be inevitable, the bifurcated 
model of memory outlined above effectively splinters our conception of memory – we yield 
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technologically mediated memory to the digital (and to the lurking ethical others) while insisting 
on subconscious embodied memory as a kind of mystical, truth-telling, (and perhaps essentially 
female) analog par excellence.  
 
IN LOVING MEMORY 
Significantly for this project, 50 First Dates links the perceived threat to human memory 
to the status of intimate relationships. This anxiety around the technological mediation of 
memory– that is, the idea that when our memories are mediated through digital technologies they 
become more vulnerable to manipulation and we become less able to detect that manipulation – 
is ultimately less of a problem for memory itself, at least as far as the films are concerned. 
Instead, in many ways the primary concern of the film is actually how a kind of decomposition 
of human memory may affect intimate relationships. Indeed, 50 First Dates is untroubled by the 
darker projections of the future of human memory and works instead to dislocate love from the 
territory of technologically mediated memory. This dislocation of love from technologically 
mediated memory, and its simultaneous cementation in subconscious embodied memory, is 
depicted in the scenario described in Chapter I in which Lucy has ostensibly forgotten Henry, yet 
she is able to reproduce his image from her subconscious through analog artistic practice. It 
follows that we may productively read the central project of the film to be the conceptual prying 
apart of love and technologically mediated memory. Put differently, 50 First Dates works to 
assert love’s resistance to technological oblivion through its location in subconscious embodied 
memory – the sacred and fiercely protected territory of the human body.  
What such representations of amnesia prod at is a kind of libidinal concern over the 
status, or better the location, of love amidst the ‘scientificization’ of our innermost impulses and 
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desires. Žižek refers to this scientificization as a process of “reflexivization and rationalization of 
modern life.”105 Žižek argues that this reflexivization has led to a scenario that “favours a quasi-
mythical ideological experience.”106 It is precisely this quasi-mythical ideological experience 
that is facilitated by subconscious embodied memory, but not its companion, technologically 
mediated memory, in 50 First Dates. In other words, it is in response to a (distinctly 
technological) modernity that the film insists upon Lucy’s mysterious and miraculous 
preservation of the essence of her love for Henry despite her amnesia. Žižek seems to speak to 
such defensive responses to life in the digital age when elsewhere he elucidates a certain 
tendency to “evoke some non-scientific ethical criterion in order to direct and posit a limitation 
to inherent scientific drive.”107 If we map the bifurcated model of memory onto Žižek’s 
argument, subconscious embodied memory can be productively understood as offering a kind of 
non-scientific ethical alternative to the threatening scientific drive of technologically mediated 
memory. Thus 50 First Dates’ constitution of love, as the ‘quasi-mystical’ and ‘non-scientific’ 
residue that persists despite both amnesia and technological mediation, is symptomatic of a more 
general cultural impulse to protect not only memory, but also the possibility of love in an age 
that as Turkle et al would suggest, works against our efforts to form intimate relationships with 
others. Ultimately, by bringing into dialogue existing discourses around, on one hand the effects 
of technology upon human memory and, on the other, the threat technology poses to intimacy, I 
have endeavoured to demonstrate the extent to which a bifurcated model of memory is always 
already embedded in discourses around how we live and love in the digital age. 
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107 Žižek, “Whither Oedipus?” 333. 
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CONTINUING CONVERSATIONS 
While the cultural concerns mentioned throughout the two chapters above constitute the 
ideological environment from which 50 First Dates emerged, the nexus of issues at stake in my 
case study continue to pervade conversations around what it means to be a properly functioning 
human being in a technological world. Put differently, we appear no closer to reconciling our 
ever-growing reliance on technological devices and 24/7 access to the web with our 
simultaneous desire to articulate a kind of exceptional and essential humanness. The popular and 
rather aggressive insistence on a minimalist aestheticization of clean and natural ‘back-to-basics’ 
living in recent years, perhaps epitomized by ‘lifestyle’ brands such as Kinfolk108 (which 
circulates both online and in print media) is one such example of our resistive response to the 
demands of ‘plugged in’ life in the digital age. In the summer of 2013 The New York Times 
published an article titled, “A Trip to Camp to Break a Tech Addiction,” describing the author’s 
experience at an adults-only summer camp run by an organization called ‘Digital Detox,’ which 
seeks to teach campers to “disconnect to reconnect.”109 Later the same month, The Huffington 
Post released a blog post written by Larry Rosen in response titled, “You Don’t Need a Digital 
Detox: You Just Need to Set Limits and Boundaries.”110 While Rosen does not dispute the 
problem – as a research psychologist he concludes that we do in fact have a problematic 
obsession with technology, particularly smart phones – he suggests that a ‘digital detox’ is not 
the solution. Instead, Rosen recommends a gradual and tightly scheduled weaning off of our 
devices. What is interesting about the dialogue between these two articles is that they concur that 
our (over)use of technology poses a problem that can only be solved by a reassertion of and 
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recommitment to the human. Furthermore, Rosen’s call for ‘limits’ and ‘boundaries’ 
demonstrates how, similarly to a model of subconscious embodied memory versus 
technologically mediated memory, the tension between the human and the technological is 
imagined in distinctly territorial terms. There is a call here for us to clearly articulate the 
boundaries of the human lest that territory be colonized by the digital. Rosen’s more tentative 
solution also reveals the extent to which “data fasts” are understood to be rather feeble 
interruptions of what ultimately appears to be the unstoppable ascension of ‘tech.’ The two 
articles speak to the variably collaborative and antagonistic co-existence of an absolutely analog 
human domain and its perhaps necessary technologically mediated counterpart. Clearly, the 
debate around how we ought to resist and/or respond to our growing and apparently inevitable 
dependence on technology persists today. It follows that investigations into the assumptions and 
imperatives informing these debates, such as the one undertaken in this thesis, stand to 
participate in the development of the growing body of interdisciplinary scholarship on the status 
of the human in the digital age. This is to say that the dyadic model of subconscious embodied 
memory and technologically mediated memory proffered by this thesis works to contribute to a 
more comprehensive understanding of the modalities of thinking that constitute one of the most 
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